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A CARIBBEAN FANTASY? THE CASE OF THE JUROR WHO
MISBEHAVED AND THE ATTORNEY WHO LET HIM GET AWAY
WITH IT: VIOLATION OF SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO AN
IMPARTIAL JURY AND EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN
GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS v. WEATHERWAX
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution accords all
criminal defendants a right to the assistance of counsel for their defense.'
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." Id. The
Sixth Amendment also accords the accused the right to an "impartial jury." Id.; see
United States v. MacCulloch, 40 MJ. 236, 238 (C.M.A. 1994) (recognizing that
Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists in military regardless of indigence). But
see Rauter v. United States, 871 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1989) (dictum) (holding no
constitutional right to counsel in civil proceeding exists); United States v. Barnes,
662 F.2d 777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that Sixth Amendment does not apply
when proceedings are civil in nature).
Sixth Amendment rights are fundamental to this country's criminal justice
process. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975) (commenting that Sixth
Amendment rights "are basic to an adversary system of criminal justice"). Because
these rights are fundamental, they have been incorporated into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. (noting inclusion of Sixth Amendment rights in "due process of law"). Thus, the right to effective assistance of
counsel arises out of the Due Process Clause. Lissa Griffin, The Right to Effective
Assistance of Appellate Counsel, 97 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 2 (1994). See generally Martin C.
Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based Standardfor Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEo. L.J. 413, 428 (1988) ("By adopting the amorphous 'reasonable attorney' standard and adding language about the
wide range of effective assistance and the strong presumption favoring attorney
competence, the [United States Supreme] Court has given lower courts the
power-without giving them adequate guidance-to interpret the all-important
right to effective assistance of counsel."); Bruce Andrew Green, Note, A Functional
Analysis of the Effective Assistance of Counse4 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1053 (1980) (analyzing role of counsel in criminal defense and standards for counsel in assisting defendant); Michael T. Judge, Comment, Control and Directionof the Defense: The All-orNothing Defense Tactic in the Context of Ineffective Representation, 10 GEO. MASON L.
REv. 209, 210 (1987) (same); Emily Rubin, Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and
Guilty Pleas: Toward a Paradigmof Informed Consent, 80 VA. L. REv. 1699, 1701-03
(1994) (discussing standards promulgated by Supreme Court in assessing effectiveness of defense counsel). But see, Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No
Clothes: The Empty Promise of the ConstitutionalRight to Effective Assistance of Counsel,
13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986) (discussing insufficiency of standards by
which to evaluate ineffectiveness of counsel and indicating that current standards
do not guarantee effectiveness of counsel).
Moreover, because the right to counsel "is one of the safeguards of the Sixth
Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and
liberty," it follows that counsel retained pursuant to the Sixth Amendment must
also render effective assistance to the advantage of the criminal defendant. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938) (maintaining right to counsel applicable
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When counsel fails to render effective legal assistance to a criminal defendant and the jury subsequently finds the defendant guilty, the defendant will oftentimes submit a writ of habeas corpus, claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel. 2 The courts must then determine whether counsel's
representation was deficient pursuant to the two-part test outlined by the
United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington.3 Under Strickto indigent criminal defendants); see Michigan v.Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632 (1986)
(stating that constitutional right to assistance of counsel is of such importance that
after formal accusation has been made, police may no longer employ techniques
for eliciting information from uncounseled defendant that may have been entirely
proper at earlier stage of investigation); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444
(1966) (holding that right to counsel present at interrogation is indispensable to
protection of Fifth Amendment privilege and recognizing that such counsel, pursuant to Sixth Amendment, must render effective assistance); United States v. McKinley, 84 F.3d 904, 908-09 (7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing right to counsel in
conjunction with Miranda warnings). Counsel retained by a party for any reason
must render "'reasonably effective assistance given the totality of the circumstances. " Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 680 (1984) (quoting Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1250 (Former 5th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 668
(1984)).
2. See, e.g., Government of the Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d 1425,
1427 (3d Cir.) (considering writ of habeas corpus filed by convicted defendant
after defense counsel failed to bring to attention of court question ofjury impartiality), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 538 (1996); see also Griffin, supra note 1, at 2 (indicating Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel is assured through right of habeas
corpus); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural
Default in FederalHabeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 679, 680 (1990) (commenting
that Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel is enforced through federal
habeas corpus).
There are countless circuit court cases in which a convicted defendant filed a
petition for habeas corpus, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g.,
Chateloin v. Singletary, 89 F.3d 749, 753 (11th Cir. 1996) (affirming denial of
habeas corpus because lower court's decision whether counsel effectively waived
right to twelve-person jury in exchange for State's agreement to not seek death
penalty was not clear); Tillett v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 106, 107-08 (3d Cir. 1989)
(holding that claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not cognizable in federal habeas corpus petition because basis for conviction for filing false sales tax
returns did not arise under Constitution or laws of United States); United States v.
Dubray, 727 F.2d 771, 772 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (holding defendant's
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by reason of alleged failure to interview
and call witnesses would not be addressed on appeal for voluntary manslaughter
because appellant did not present claims to district court).
3. 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 (1984). To establish constitutional ineffectiveness of
trial counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment right, the defendant must prove:
(1) that he or she did not receive reasonably effective assistance, considering all
the circumstances, and then (2) that there is a "reasonable probability that the
result of the proceeding would have been different" had the defendant received
competent assistance. Id. at 688, 694; see Griffin, supra note 1, at 2 (discussing
fundamental nature of Sixth Amendment rights and Strickland test's role in preserving such rights); Calhoun, supra note 1, at 428 ("By adopting the amorphous
'reasonable attorney' standard and adding language about the wide range of effective assistance and the strong presumption favoring attorney competence, the
[Supreme] Court has given lower courts the power-without giving them adequate guidance-to interpret the all-important right to effective assistance of counsel.
...); Sonia Y. Lee, Comment, OC's PD's Feeling the Squeeze-The Right to
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land, the criminal defendant must overcome a difficult burden of proof.4
If a court determines that an attorney rendered ineffective assistance to a
client pursuant to Strickland, the accused attorney may rebut this determination by maintaining that he or she made a strategic decision. 5 The basis
for a strategic decision, however, must be legitimate and within the best
6
professional judgment of the attorney.
Counsel: In Light of Budget Cuts, Can the Orange County Office of the Public Defender
ProvideEffective Assistance of Counsel?, 29 Lov. LA. L. REv. 1895, 1899, 1901 (1996)

(discussing Sixth Amendment right to counsel and quality of counsel mandated by
Constitution).
4. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90 (discussing high standard of two-part test
which criminal defendant must meet to prove counsel rendered ineffective
assistance).
5. Id. It is arguable that a strategic choice by counsel that deprives a defendant of his or her constitutional right to testify, absent a knowing waiver by the
defendant, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d
1071, 1082 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (Godbold, J., dissenting). Nonetheless,
"even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in
the same way." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90 (citing Gary Goodpaster, The Trialfor
Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 343
(1983)); see also Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The
Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 323, 334 n.64 (noting that Justice

O'Connor, in Strickland, cited Professor Goodpaster's article "only for the proposition that '[e]ven the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular
client in the same way."' (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citing Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58

N.Y.U. L. Rv. 299, 343 (1983)))); Richard C. Dieter, Note, Ethical Choicesfor Attorneys Whose Clients Elect Execution, 3 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 799, 804-06 (1990) (discussing different approaches taken by attorney when discussing what pleas to enter
when death penalty is ultimate punishment); Matthew D. Forsgren, Note, The Outer
Edge of the Envelope: Disqualificationof White CollarCriminalDefense Attorneys Under the
JointDefense Doctrine,78 MINN. L. REv. 1219, 1227 (1994) (recognizing that defense
attorneys differ on strategic issues and styles of advocacy). Arguably, however, permissible trial strategy can never include the failure to conduct a reasonably substantial investigation into a defendant's one plausible line of defense. See Ewing v.
Williams, 596 F.2d 391, 399 (9th Cir. 1979) (Ely, J., dissenting) (stating that "complete lack of preparation and investigation [cannot] be deemed to be a 'tactical

decision' made by the attorney"); Wood v. Zahradnick, 430 F. Supp. 107, 112 (E.D.
Va. 1977) (observing where defenses based upon mental condition were only plausible lines of defense, the court was able to "envision no tactical reason why these
defenses were not explored").
6. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 680. "Because advocacy is an art and not a science
• . . [and] requires deference to counsel's informed decisions, strategic choices
must be respected in these circumstances if they are based on professional judgment." Id. at 681 (citing Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1254); see also Vivian 0. Berger, The
Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths-A Dead End?, 86 COLUM.
L. REv. 9, 113 (1986) (stating that Strickland Court appropriately recognized that
overturning convictions is ineffective way to guarantee effective assistance). But see
William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and PracticalUndermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY Bn±L RTs. J. 91, 92-95 (1995) (stating
that Supreme Court's adoption of Strickland test has undermined right to counsel
of indigent defendants recognized in Gideon v. Wainuright); Richard P. Rhodes,
Note, Strickland v. Washington: Safeguard of the CapitalDefendant's Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel?, 12 B.C. THiRD WORLD L.J. 121, 122 (1992) (asserting that
Supreme Court furnished vague guidelines by which to evaluate effectiveness of
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Courts are generally reluctant to find that an attorney rendered ineffective assistance. 7 Thus, many accord a great deal of deference to decisions made by counsel during the course of the trial.8 Unfortunately, this
misplaced and generous deference often excuses questionable conduct
that would otherwise have been ineffective but for the capacious Strickland
discretion requirement. 9

counsel's assistance and subsequently failed to safeguard capital defendant's rights
to effective assistance of counsel).
7. For a discussion of a court's reluctance to find that an attorney rendered
ineffective assistance, see supra note 6 and infra notes 8-9.
8. Compare Williams v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. Unit A 1982)
(holding that defense counsel was not ineffective for failure to call certain character witnesses and failure to request limiting instructions on aggravating circumstances that were considered byjury), Cox v. Wyrick, 642 F.2d 222, 226-27 (8th Cir.
1981) (holding that counsel's failure to object to admission of mug shot of defendant for identification purposes did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel), and United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 210-11 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc)
(determining that counsel did not render ineffective assistance when he made tactical decision to waive opening statement), with Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391, 395
& n.8 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding that grossly inadequate preparation of counsel constituted ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of Sixth Amendment).
9. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (stating strong presumption exists "that counsel's performance falls within 'wide range of
professional assistance"' and defendant bears burden of proving that counsel's
representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that
challenged action was not sound strategy (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689));
Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 100-01 (1955) (maintaining that attorney performance is properly measured in terms of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms); United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253, 1272 (6th Cir. 1991)
(stating that "[e]ffective assistance is presumed and the court will not question
matters which involve trial strategy"); see also United States v. Boyles, 57 F.3d 535,
551 (7th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that court will not second-guess trial tactic decisions that are reasonably based); Tomlin v. Myers, 30 F.3d 1235, 1244 (9th Cir.
1994) (George,J., dissenting) ("While we may disagree with counsel's tactics, such
tactics do not fall outside of the wide ambit of reasonable representation merely
because their wisdom is subject to second-guessing."); Griffin v. Wainwright, 760
F.2d 1505, 1514 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that tactical decision "will almost never
be overturned on habeas corpus"); Perron v. Perrin, 742 F.2d 669, 673 (1st Cir.
1984) (emphasizing that judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly
deferential and court shall not second-guess tactical decisions made by counsel);
United States v. Greer, 737 F.2d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[W]e are not free to
second guess legitimate tactical decisions, rather, we examine only those blunders
not classifiable as attorneys' tactics and determine whether they amount to grossly
unprofessional conduct."); United States v. Bad Cob, 560 F.2d 877, 881 (8th Cir.
1977) (commenting that attorney's professional judgment regarding tactical decisions should not be second-guessed by hindsight (citing McQueen v. Swenson, 498
F.2d 207, 216 (8th Cir. 1974))); United States v. Moore, 529 F.2d 355, 357 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (considering second-guessing strategic and tactical decisions made by
counsel and that inadequate preparation by counsel constitutes ineffective assistance); United States v. Hager, 505 F.2d 737, 739 (8th Cir. 1974) (stating that "'the
exercise of a defense attorney's professional judgment should not be secondguessed by hindsight"' (quoting McQueen, 498 F.2d at 216)).
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In Government of the Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax,10 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit confronted the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel.1 1 In its analysis the court applied the two-part test
established in Strickland, and gave a great deal of deference to counsel's
12
actions when considering the defense attorney's strategic decision. Ultimately, in a 2-1 decision the Weatherwax court held that although the defense attorney rendered ineffective assistance under the Strickland test, the
attorney did in fact make a strategic decision with regard to the disclosure
of possible jury prejudice, thereby rendering his legal assistance effective. 13 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit's determination that the attorney in
Weatherwax made a strategic decision is questionable because the court
failed to fully consider both Supreme Court precedent and the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct when evaluating counsel's decision not to call
14
the trial court's attention to a prejudiced juror.
This Note examines the reasoning of the Third Circuit in Weatherwax. 15 Specifically, it discusses a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to a fair trial, including the right to an impartial, unprejudiced jury
and to the effective assistance of counsel. 16 Part II considers the precedential value of Strickland v. Washington,1 7 a landmark Supreme Court case
that established a two-part test for determining whether an attorney renders ineffective, and thus, unconstitutional assistance. 18 Additionally, Part
II examines the pre-Strickland approaches of other federal courts regarding a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.' 9 Part III of this Note
recounts the facts and procedural history of Weatherwax.20 Part TV discusses the majority's rationale for holding that the defense attorney ren10. 77 F.3d 1425 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 538 (1996).
11. Id.
12. See id. at 1431 (stating that "evaluation of reasonableness must begin with
,strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance"' (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89)).
13. Id. For a discussion ofJudge Stapleton's majority decision in Weatherwax,
see infra notes 78-107 and accompanying text.
14. For a detailed discussion of United States Supreme Court precedent, see
infra notes 38-51 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the ABA Model Rules

of Professional Conduct, see infra notes 36, 52 and accompanying text.
15. For a detailed discussion of the reasoning of Weatherwax, see infra notes
78-107 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial, an impartial
jury and effective assistance of counsel, see supra note 1 and infra notes 61-67 and
accompanying text.
17. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
18. For a full discussion of Strickland and the two-part test outlined by the
Supreme Court, see infra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of other circuit courts' approaches to the issues of ineffective assistance of counsel, see infra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the facts and procedural history of Weatherwax, see
infra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
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dered effective assistance and the dissent's disapproval of the holding.2 '
Part IV also provides a critical analysis of the Third Circuit's decision in
Weatherwax, suggesting that the court inappropriately disregarded several
professional standards which bind an attorney when representing a client.2 2 Moreover, Part IV suggests that the Weatherwax court misapplied
the Strickland test.23 Finally, Part V of this Note illuminates the possible
ramifications of Weatherwax, including its possible effect on future judicial
decisions involving the Sixth Amendment issues of ineffective assistance of
24
counsel and prejudiced juries.
II.

BACKGROUND

The Strickland test, which guides a court in determining whether an

attorney rendered effective assistance, has proven to be a landmark decision as predicted by the United States Supreme Court. 25

Despite the

precedential -value of the Strickland standard, however, the professional
standards that bind criminal defense attorneys in representing a client and
an attorney's duty to fully consult with his or her client regarding the
course of a trial remain integral in deciding a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.2 6 Hand-in-hand with the Sixth Amendment right to ef21. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's holding in Weatherwax and the rationale underlying its decision, see infra notes 78-107 and accompanying text. For
a discussion ofJudge Lewis's dissenting opinion in Weatherwax, see infra notes 10818 and accompanying text.
22. For a critical analysis of the Third Circuit's holding in Weatherwax, see
infra notes 119-56 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's misapplication of the Stricklanddiscretion requirement, see infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the impact of the Weatherwax decision on future court
decisions, see infra notes 157-59.
25. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 (1984). Strickland is the
seminal case in the area of ineffective assistance of counsel and Sixth Amendment

violation claims and has been cited several times by each circuit court and in ap-

proximately 20 Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
648, 666 n.41 (1984) (applying Strickland standard to evaluate defendant's claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel); Nagi v. United States, 90 F.3d 130, 135, 137 (6th
Cir. 1996) (same), cert. denied, No. 96-7218, 1996 WL 745354 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1997);
Boria v. Keane, 90 F.3d 36, 37 (2d Cir.) (same) (per curiam), petition for cert. filed,
65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1996) (No. 96-628); Chateloin v. Singletary, 89
F.3d 749, 752 (11th Cir. 1996) (same); Mazzell v. Evatt, 88 F.3d 263, 266, 269 (4th
Cir.) (same), cert. denied sub nom. Mazzell v. Moore, 117 S. Ct. 527 (1996); Thompson v. Calderon, 86 F.3d 1509, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v.
Carr, 80 F.3d 413, 417-19 (10th Cir. 1996) (same); Enoch v. Gramley, 70 F.3d 1490,
1502 (7th Cir. 1995) (same), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 95 (1996); Nichols v. Scott, 69
F.3d 1255, 1284 (5th Cir. 1995) (same), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2559 (1996); Vance
v. Lehman, 64 F.3d 119, 122, 124 (3d Cir. 1995) (same), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 736
(1996); United States v. McGill, 11 F.3d 223, 226 (1st Cir. 1993) (same); United
States v. Williams, 994 F.2d 1287, 1291 (8th Cir. 1993) (same); Casale v. Fair, 833
F.2d 386, 391 (lst Cir. 1987) (same). For a discussion of the facts, holding and
precedential value of Strickland, see infra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of the professional standards that bind attorneys when
representing clients, see infra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
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fective assistance of counsel is the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
jury. Because juries form the cornerstone of a trial and are the gatekeepers to a defendant's fate, issues ofjury prejudice are often closely followed
27
by claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
A.

The Stars that Guide

Although it was not the first court to consider the ineffectiveness of
counsel, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit confronted the issue in United States v. Long.28 The immediate ancestor of the
Strickland decision, Long held that a court must exercise discretion in evaluating counsel's strategic decisions when considering an ineffectiveness
claim against the decision-making attorney.2 9 In Long, the defendant alleged that the prosecutor made prejudicial statements to which defense
counsel failed to object.3 0 In order to determine if the prosecutor had in
fact made prejudicial statements, the court considered whether the prosecutor's statements, when taken as a whole in the context of the entire case,
prejudicially impacted the defendant's substantive rights. 3 ' In doing so,
however, the Long court failed to define the defendant's burden of proof
32
for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel.
27. For a discussion of the right to an impartial jury and the problem ofjuror
misconduct, see infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
28. 674 F.2d 848 (11th Cir. 1982).
29. Id. at 855. The defendants in Long were convicted in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama for violating drug laws. Id. at
850. One of the defendants charged that the prosecutor made three false and
prejudicial statements about the defendants. Id. at 855. Defense counsel, however, did not draw the court's attention to these statements at the time they were
made. Id. Subsequently, the defendant alleged that he had received ineffective
assistance from his attorney. Id. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that there
was no Sixth Amendment violation. Id.
30. Id. The court also considered whether the defense counsel's failure to
call alibi witnesses denied the defendant effective assistance of counsel. Id.
31. Id.; see also United States v. Carroll, 678 F.2d 1208, 1210 (4th Cir. 1982)
(granting new trial on basis of prejudicial statements made by prosecutor in closing arguments, inferring that defendant lied to defense counsel); United States v.
Corona, 551 F.2d 1386, 1388 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that prosecutor who made
improper comments prejudiced substantial rights of defendant). But see United
States v. Ferrera, 746 F.2d 908, 911 (lst Cir. 1984) (finding that prosecutor who
argued evidence not presented during trial in closing arguments did not prejudice
defendant's rights even though evidence was adverse to defendant); Morrison v.
Duckworth, 550 F. Supp. 533, 536-38 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (determining that prosecutor's closing remarks regarding absent witness were rendered harmless by overwhelming evidence presented even though remarks were shocking and
reprehensible).
32. Long, 674 F.2d at 855. For a discussion of the facts, holding and precedential value of Long, see supra notes 28-31. This author has concluded that, in retrospect, the Eleventh Circuit's reluctance to second-guess counsel's strategic or
tactical decisions helped pave the way for the Strickland decision, which also afforded counsel a broad range of decision-making powers. In effect, the Long decision laid the groundwork for the prejudice prong, which is the second prong of
the Strickland test. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-90 (1984) (stat-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 6
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42: p. 275

One year after the Long decision, in Jones v. Barnes,3 3 the Supreme

Court reiterated that a criminal defendant has the ultimate authority to
make certain fundamental decisions regarding the course of his or her
defense, including whether to enter a guilty plea or whether to testify on
his or her own behalf.3 4 The Jones Court noted, however, that the accused
does not have a constitutional right to insist that counsel advance every
nonfrivolous argument that he or she wants raised.3 5 In addition, theJones
ing that to prove ineffective assistance of counsel defendant must prove counsel's
conduct prejudiced otherwise favorable outcome for defendant). The Long court
refused to "second-guess tactical decisions of counsel in deciding whether to call
certain witnesses." Long, 674 F.2d at 855 (citing United States v. Hughes, 635 F.2d
449, 453 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that "[a] defense counsel's trial strategy, which
would include his asking or refraining from asking certain questions of witnesses,
does not reach constitutional proportions")); see also United States v. Samuels, 59
F.3d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that defendant was not denied effective
assistance of counsel at sentencing when counsel failed to object to pre-sentence
investigation report's finding that defendant smuggled crack rather than cocaine
into country); Lovett v. Florida, 627 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[C]ounsel for a
criminal defendant is not required to pursue every path until it bears fruit or until
all conceivable hope withers."); United States v.Johnson, 615 F.2d 1125, 1127 (5th
Cir. 1980) (finding that defense counsel satisfied duty to interview potential witnesses and conduct examination of factual circumstances); Buckelew v. United
States, 575 F.2d 515, 521 (5th Cir. 1978) (determining that defense counsel's failure to call certain witnesses is not sufficient grounds for Sixth Amendment claim).
33. 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
34. Id. at 750-53. Fundamental decisions recognized by the Jones Court differ
slightly from the ABA Standardsfor CriminalJustice. See id. at 754 (Blackmum, J.,
concurring) (observing that ABA's view is, "as an ethical matter, an attorney
should argue on appeal all non-frivolous claims upon which his client insists").
TheJones Court considered whether certain fundamental decisions are to be made
by a criminal defendant such as: whether to plead guilty; whether to waive the right
to ajury trial; whether to testify on one's own behalf; whether to take an appeal; or
whether to waive the right to counsel. Id. at 751; see also Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (recognizing right to self-representation and right of counsel
to make strategic decisions); Jameson v. Coughlin, 22 F.3d 427, 429-30 (2d Cir.
1994) (holding that appellate counsel was not ineffective for not questioning discharge of juror); Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 1993) (establishing no failure to adequately investigate mitigatory evidence); Lilly v. Gilmore,
988 F.2d 783, 786 (7th Cir. 1993) ("The Sixth Amendment does not require [appellate] counsel to forecast changes or advances in the law, or to press meritless
arguments before a court.").
Likewise, the ABA Standardsfor CriminalJusticeindicate that the accused must
be permitted to make some decisions regarding the course of his or her defense
after thorough consultation with counsel. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Standard 4-5.2(a) (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter

CRIMINALJUSTICE STANDARDS].

Such

decisions include what pleas should be entered, whether to accept a plea agreement, whether to waive ajury trial, whether to testify on his or her own behalf and
whether to appeal. Id. at Standard 4-5.2(a) (i)-(v).
35. Jones, 463 U.S. at 754. Specifically, the Supreme Court in Jones held that a
criminal defendant has a constitutional right under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses to an appeal, but he or she does not have a constitutional right
to insist that appellate counsel advance every nonfrivolous argument that the defendant suggests. Id. at 756. Thus, although Jones confronted the issue of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel rather than trial counsel, the same "right to counsel"
rationale is applicable to each. See Griffin, supra note 1, at 2-6 (discussing appro-
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Court explained that counsel may make nonfundamental decisions on the
basis of counsel's professional judgment only after ample consultation
with the client.3 6 Thus, Long and Jones failed to establish a discrete federal
standard by which courts could evaluate a defendant's claim of ineffective
37
assistance of counsel.
The federal courts were finally offered some guidance in their evaluation of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel when the Supreme
Court articulated a two-part test in Strickland v. Washington.38 In Strickland,

piate standard for assessing effectiveness of appellate counsel). Griffin noted,
however, that:
[A] finding of ineffectiveness of trial counsel has a substantially greater
impact on finality than does a finding of ineffectiveness of appellate
counsel because of the greater factual complexity of trial ineffectiveness
claims, the more extensive procedures required to resolve those claims,
and the drastic remedy-reversal of a criminal conviction-required for
ineffectiveness of trial counsel but not for ineffectiveness of appellate
counsel.
Id. at 4.

36. Jones, 463 U.S. at 753 n.6. The Jones Court quoted the 1982 edition of the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. (citing ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (Final Draft 1982)). It should be noted that the 1995
edition of Rule 1.2(a) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct is identical to

the 1982 edition cited by the Supreme Court in Jones in 1983. The rule states in
pertinent part that:
[A] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of
representation . . .and shall consult with the client as to the means by
which they are to be pursued .... In a criminal case, the lawyer shall

abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a
plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will
testify.
ABA MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.2(a) (1996) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES].

37. Jones, 463 U.S. at 754.

38. 466 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984). The respondent in Strickland pleaded guilty
in a Florida trial court to three capital murder charges. Id. at 672. Except for a
string of burglaries, the respondent had no significant prior criminal record. Id.
He stated that his inability to support his family caused him a great deal of stress,
which triggered his crime spree. Id. The judge responded that he had "'a great
deal of respect for people who are willing to step forward and admit their responsibility."' Id. (citation omitted).
In preparing for the sentencing hearing, defense counsel failed to seek a presentence report because it would have included the respondent's criminal history,
thus undermining the claim of no significant prior criminal record. Id. at 673.
Defense counsel also failed to obtain a psychiatric examination and character witnesses. Id. The trial judge, finding no mitigating and only aggravating circumstances, sentenced the respondent to death on all murder counts. Id. at 674.
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's sentence and affirmed
its denial of the respondent's complaint claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.
Id. at 675, 677-78. The respondent then filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court. Id. at 678. The district court denied relief, but the court of
appeals reversed, holding that the Sixth Amendment accords criminal defendants
"a right to 'counsel ...rendering reasonably effective assistance given the totality
of the circumstances."' Id. 678-80 (quoting Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d

1243, 1250 (Former 5th Cir. Unit B 1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). The United
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the Court evaluated a defendant's claim that counsel failed to provide the
defendant with effective assistance at the criminal trial.3 9 To establish
constitutional ineffectiveness of trial counsel under the two-part Strickland
analysis, a defendant must first prove that "counsel's performance was deficient."4 0 Second, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel's "defiStates Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, however, and re-affirmed the
district court decision denying habeas relief. 1d. at 670.
Today, the Strickland test is the sole standard by which a court evaluates
whether an attorney has rendered effective assistance, and every court that applies
the Strickland test grants a great deal of deference to an attorney when evaluating
decisions made during trial. In addition, Strickland has been cited extensively by
each circuit court and the Supreme Court. For a further discussion of the wide
application of the Strickland test, see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
39. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698-701. For a general discussion of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, see Lee, supra note 3,at 1899-1901 (discussing defendant's right to effective assistance of trial counsel).
Prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Strickland, and prior to the establishment of a test to determine whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance, the
Eleventh Circuit confronted the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. See
United States v. Long, 674 F.2d 848 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating that counsel is given
deference by court over strategic decisions). The Long court held that defense
counsel rendered effective assistance. Id. at 855. Further, Long recognized the
broad discretion with which a court is to consider counsel's strategic decisions. Id.
For a further discussion of Long, see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
To determine whether the prosecutor's statements during trial were prejudicial, the court considered if the prosecutor's statements, taken as a whole in the
context of the entire case, prejudicially affected the substantial rights of the defendant. Id.; see also United States v. Corona, 551 F.2d 1386, 1388 (5th Cir. 1977)
(holding that substantial rights of defendant were grossly prejudiced because of
prosecutor misstatements); United States v. Rodriquez, 503 F.2d 1370, 1371 (5th
Cir. 1974) (holding that substantial rights of defendant were not prejudiced by
prosecutor's prejudicial closing argument and that closing argument constituted
harmless error only). But seeBerger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (denying reversal of conviction where no prejudice to substantial rights of indicted conspirator occurred); United States v. Rhoden, 453 F.2d 598, 600 (5th Cir. 1972)
(holding that prosecutor's alleged improper argument was harmless, where prejudicial effect was slight and evidence of guilt was overwhelming). The court further
held that defense counsel's failure to call alibi witnesses did not deny the defendant effective assistance of counsel. Long, 674 F.2d at 855. The court refused to
"second-guess tactical decisions of counsel in deciding whether to call certain witnesses." Id. (citation omitted); see also United States v. Johnson, 615 F.2d 1125,
1127 (5th Cir. 1980) (recognizing presumption that counsel's decisions are reasonable and in best interest of client and refusing to second-guess counsel's tactical decisions). The reluctance of the Eleventh Circuit to second-guess strategic or
tactical decisions made by counsel helped pave the way for the Strickland decision,
as the broad discretion given by the court to counsel's strategic or tactical decisions was a major point discussed by the Strickland Court. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687-96 (establishing test for ineffective assistance of counsel and stating that court
shall exercise broad discretion in considering strategic decisions made by
counsel).
40. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. By the time Stricklandwas decided, each of the
federal courts of appeals had held that the proper standard for attorney performance was that of "reasonably effective assistance" and that 'judicial scrutiny of
counsel's performance must be highly deferential." Id. at 689. For a further discussion of Stricklandand the standard of attorney performance that is considered
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cient performance prejudiced the defense." 4 1 Pursuant to Strickland,
therefore, a defendant must make both showings in order to prove that
the punishment received "resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable."42
Furthermore, the Strickland Court asserted that a defendant dissatisfied with the quality of counsel's assistance must show that his or her coun43
sel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
when assessing a claim'of ineffective assistance of counsel, see infranotes 43-46 and
accompanying text.
41. Strickland,466 U.S. at 687. The Court stated that in order to establish the
second prong, the dissatisfied party must show that "counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id.
Consequently, "[a] n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does
not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had
no effect on the judgment." Id. at 691; cf. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361,
364-65 (1981) (describing decisions where convictions were overturned for prejudicial circumstances in case).
The Strickland Court also noted that in order to establish prejudice, the defendant must prove that "but for the deficient performance of counsel, there is a
reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different." Griffin, supra note 1, at 2 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). The Strickland
Court defined "reasonable probability" as a "'probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome."' Jeffries & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 684 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694); see Louis D. Bilionis, Moral Appropriateness, CapitalPunishment, and the Lockett Doctrine, 82 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 318 (1991)
(discussing "reasonable probability" standard for determining constitutional violations of defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel); Jeffrey B. Keck, Criminal Procedure: Trial and Appeal, 39 Sw. L.J. 495, 498 n.20 (1985) (discussing
majority opinion in Strickland); Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless ConstitutionalError, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 79, 108 n.111 (1988) (discussing right to counsel and tests used to enforce right); see also WAYNE 1k LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.6, at 67 (Supp. 1989) (stating probability that counsel's
actions undermined confidence in outcome must exist in establishing ineffectiveness of counsel claim). Notably, the Supreme Court maintained that "the principles.., stated [in the opinion] do not establish mechanical rules." Strickland, 466
U.S. at 696.
42. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Although the Court discussed the perform-

ance component of an ineffectiveness claim before discussing the prejudice component, "there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to
approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the
inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Id. at 697. Thus,

a court does not need to determine whether counsel's performance was inadequate before considering the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the
alleged deficiencies. Id. "The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade
counsel's performance." Id.
43. Id. at 687-91. Following the ruling that the standard by which to assess

counsel ineffectiveness is that of objective reasonableness, the Court stated that
more specific guidelines are inappropriate. Id. at 688. Justice O'Connor stated:
The Sixth Amendment refers simply to "counsel," not specifying particular requirements of effective assistance. It relies instead on the legal
profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the
Amendment envisions. The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.

Id. (citations omitted).
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The burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland standard is therefore extremely difficult, because there is a strong
presumption that an attorney's strategic decisions fall within reasonable
professional norms. 44 Thus, the Supreme Court in Strickland maintained
that judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferen-

tial. 45 In other words, a court must presume that in rendering assistance,

Courts have emphasized that "counsel for a criminal defendant is not required to pursue every path until it bears fruit or until all conceivable hope withers." Lovett v. Florida, 627 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Rummel v. Estelle,
590 F.2d 103, 104 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (stating attorneys must conduct
substantial investigation which includes "an independent examination of the facts,
circumstances, pleadings, and laws involved"), affd, 445 U.S. 263 (1980); United
States v. Moore, 554 F.2d 1086, 1092-93 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (explaining that counsel
must make both factual and legal investigations).
Compare Williams v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 381, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1982) (determining that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to call certain character
witnesses and request limiting instructions on statutory aggravating circumstances
that were considered by jury), Cox v. Wyrick, 642 F.2d 222, 226-27 (8th Cir. 1981)
(holding that counsel's failure to object to admission of mug shot of defendant for
identification purposes did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel), and
United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 210-11 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (determining that
counsel did not render ineffective assistance when counsel made tactical decision
to waive opening statement), with Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391, 395 n.8 (5th Cir.
1981) (stating that inadequate preparation of counsel, while it constituted ineffective assistance of counsel in immediate case, does not always constitute Sixth
Amendment violation).
The Supreme Court established that reasonably effective assistance, considering all of the surrounding circumstances, is the proper standard by which to judge
attorney performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-91. Relevant factors used to determine "reasonableness" include: (1) the attorney's experience; (2) the inconsistency of pursued and abandoned lines of defense; and (3) the potential for
prejudice from taking an abandoned line of defense. See Griffin, supra note 1, at 9
(citing Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1256-57 n.23 (Former 5th Cir.
1982)).
44. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-91. Because an evaluation of an attorney's performance is difficult, the court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id.
Thus, the defendant must overcome the presumption that counsel's course of action, under the circumstances governing at the time the decision was made, was
"sound trial strategy." Id. at 689; see State v. Yarber, 656 N.E.2d 1322, 1325 (Ohio
App. 1995) (holding that accused is denied effective assistance of counsel where
defense counsel's strategy is so outside "realm of legitimate trial strategy... [as to
make ordinary trial counsel] 'scoff" at hearing it); cf Kimmelman v. Morrison,
477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (stating that strong presumptions exist "that counsel's
performance falls within the 'wide range of professional assistance'"; that defendant bears burden of proving not only that counsel's representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms but also that challenged action was not
sound strategy (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689)); Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S.
91, 100-01 (1955) (maintaining that attorney performance is properly measured in
terms of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms); United States v.
Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253, 1272 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that "[e]ffective assistance
is presumed and the court will not question matters which involve trial strategy"
(citation omitted)).
45. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89. A fair assessment of attorney performance
requires that every effort be made to eliminate the "distorting effects of hindsight,
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counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.

46

Following the Strickland decision, the Supreme Court confronted the
issue of decisions made by counsel that are contrary to reasonable professional judgment in Batson v. Kentucky.4 7 Specifically, the Batson Court confronted the issue of racial partisanship in jury selection and rejected the
notion that it is reasonable for an attorney to assume that jurors are likely
to sympathize with a criminal defendant based simply on the fact that both
the jurors and the defendant are African-American. 48 The Supreme
Court recognized that a person's "competence to serve as a juror ultimately depends on an assessment of individual qualifications and ability
impartially to consider evidence presented at trial"' 49 Moreover, the Court exto reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct and to evaluate
the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Id. at 689.
46. Id. The Strickland Court stated: "It is all too tempting for a defendant to
second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all
too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful,
to conclude that a particular act or omission was unreasonable." Id.; see Engle v.
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 133-34 (1982) (stating that "every trial presents a myriad of
possible claims" and that court grants discretion to counsel who may have overlooked or chosen to omit an argument while pursuing other avenues of defense).
In fairly assessing an attorney's performance, the Strickland Court noted that courts
must make a conscious effort to "eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight," to
reconstruct the challenging circumstances counsel faced and to evaluate counsel's

conduct "from the perspective of counsel at the time he made the decision." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Furthermore, the Strickland Court stated that "countless
ways" exist "to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal
defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." Id. For a
discussion of the deference the Third Circuit gave Attorney Michael Joseph in
holding strategic his decision not to conduct a voir dire on his client's allegedly
prejudiced jury, see infra notes 88-96.
47. 476 U.S. 79 (1986), modified sub nom. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
48. Id. at 97. In Batson, the defendant petitioner was an African-American
male. Id. at 82. A Kentucky trial judge conducted a voir dire examination on the
jury and excused certain jurors for cause. Id. The prosecutor then used his preemptory challenges to strike all four African-Americans from the jury, leaving an

all-white jury. Id. Defense counsel objected to the all-white jury on the ground
that the prosecutor's removal of the African-American jurors violated the defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, which grant the accused a right to
a jury drawn from a cross section of the community. Id. The Supreme Court in
Batson reaffirmed the Strauder v. West Virginia principle, stating: "[T] he State denies [an African-American] defendant equal protection of the laws when it puts
him on trial before ajury from which members of his race have been purposefully
excluded." Id. at 85 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)).
49. Id. (emphasis added). The Court further stated:
Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant's right to equal protection because it denies him the protection
that a trial by jury is intended to secure. "The very idea of ajury is a body
. . . composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is
selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows,
associates, persons having the same legal status in society as that which he
holds."
Id. at 86 (quoting Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308).
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plicidy stated that a person's race is simply not related in any way to his or
her fitness as a juror.50 Today, Batson continues to serve as a hallmark
case, standing for the proposition that attorneys and judges are prohibited
51
from basing decisions regarding jurors on race.
B.

The Standards that Bind

Professional standards provide the courts with guidance when evaluating the performance of counsel. More importantly, professional standards
obligate an attorney to exercise reasonable professional judgment at all
times, to zealously represent the client, to keep the client well-informed
about the case, and to consult with the client regarding fundamental decisions, both preceding and during the course of trial. 52 Similarly, and in
50. Id. Unfortunately, "the principle of constitutional color blindness historically has been either nonexistent or elusive." DONALD E. LIVELY ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, HISTORY, AND DIALOGUES 57 (1996).
51. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86. Noting that "racial exclusion in this official forum
compounds the racial insult inherent in judging a citizen by the color of his or her
skin," the Court in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991), extended the Batson principle to civil trials. Id. at 2080. Thus, not only has Batson
been repeatedly relied upon by the Supreme Court, the circuit courts and several
state courts, but also the Third Circuit clearly relies on the Batson precedent. See
generally Purkett v. Elerm, 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995) (holding that using preemptory
strike on African-American juror on basis of his unkempt hair, mustache and
beard was race-neutral; also discussing Batson argument raised by preempted juror); McCrory v. Henderson, 82 F.3d 1243, 1246 (2d Cir. 1996) (discussing Batson
in consideration of claim of racial partisanship); Riley v. Taylor, 62 F.3d 86, 88 (3d
Cir. 1995) (same); Walker v. Vaughn, 53 F.3d 609, 610 (3d Cir. 1995) (same);
Simmons v. Beyer, 44 F.3d 1160, 1165 (3d Cir. 1995) (same); United States v.

Lewis, 40 F.3d 1325, 1341 (1st Cir. 1994) (same).
52. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d 1425, 1431
(3d Cir. 1996) (referring to ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, "The Defense
Function," Standard 4-1.1 to 4-8.6 (2d ed. 1980)), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 538 (1996).
In addition to the ABA professional standards, it has been argued that an
attorney's duty to his or her client arises out of the principle of agency. Brinkley v.
Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 1283, 1286 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding that
attorney had duty to client because both parties consented to formation of attorney-client relationship); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 cmt. e (1958). The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that an attorney-client relationship is one of agency, to which general rules of agency apply.
Brinkley, 485 F.2d at 1286. But see Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
580 F.2d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1978) ("[T]he attorney is held to obligations to the
client which go far beyond those of an agent and beyond the principles of
agency.").
Rule 1.1 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct states in full that "[a]
lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client." MODEL RULES, supra
note 36, at Rule 1.1. Moreover, "competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." Id.
The ABA Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility outlines that "perhaps the most

fundamental legal skill consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any particular specialized
knowledge." Id. at cmt. 2. Moreover, "a lawyer should act with competence and
proper care in representing clients." ABA
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accord with the Sixth Amendment, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Con-

duct state that "[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation of a client" and shall act as a competent advisor to the client. 5 3 The ABA
siBtary EC 6-1 (1983) [hereinafter

MODEL CODE];

see also MODEL

RULES,

supra note

36, at Rule 1.1 ("A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.").
The Preliminary Statement of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility
indicates that it is designed to be adopted as an inspirational guide "and as a basis
for disciplinary action when the conduct of a lawyer falls below the required minimum standards stated in the Disciplinary Rules." MODEL CODE, supra, at Preliminary Statement. The Preamble to the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility
states:
Each lawyer must find within his own conscience the touchstone against
which to test the extent to which his actions should rise above minimum
standards .... [I] t is the desire for the respect and confidence of the
members of his profession and of the society which he serves that should
provide to a lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical
conduct.
Id., supra, at pmbl. In contrast to the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct are "rules of reason." MODEL RULES,
supra note 36, at Scope.
Rule 1.3 of the ABA Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct states: "A lawyer shall act
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." Id. at Rule
1.3. Similar to Rule 1.3, Canon seven of the ABA Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility states: "The advocate may urge any permissible construction of the law
favorable to his client, without regard to his professional opinion as to the likelihood that the construction will ultimately prevail." MODEL CODE, supra, at EC 7-4.
Rule 2.1 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct states:

In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional
judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may
refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's
situation.
MODEL RULES, supra note 36, at Rule 2.1. Similarly, ethical consideration 7-5 to
Canon seven of the ABA Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility states that a lawyer
acting as an advisor, "furthers the interest of his client by giving his professional
opinion as to what he believes would likely be the ultimate decision of the courts
on the matter at hand and by informing his client of the practical effect of such
decision." MODEL CODE, supra, at EC 7-5.
Rule 1.4(a) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that the "guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for

information consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests, and the
client's overall requirements as to the character of representation." MODEL RULES,
supra note 36, at Rule 1.4(a) cmt. 2. Comment 1 to Rule 1.4 attests that an attorney should ensure that his client has "sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of representation and the means by
which they are to be pursued." Id. at cmt. 1.
53. MODEL RULEs, supra note 36, at Rules 1.1, 2.1. A lawyer is obligated to
provide his client with an honest assessment of the client's situation and straightforward advice about which course of action to pursue. Id. at Rule 2.1 cmt. 1.
Oftentimes, a client is averse to confront the unpleasant facts of his or her case and
advised courses of action. Id. Comment 1 of Rule 1.3 states:
A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition,
obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and may take

whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's
cause or endeavor. A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication
to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's
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Standards for CriminalJustice also reflect the underlying premise of the

Sixth Amendment, which stands for the proposition that a criminal defendant enjoys a right to assistance of counsel for his or her defense. 54 In
55
general, counsel's professional judgment outweighs and supersedes.
Moreover, while defense counsel must consult with the client as to any
strategic or tactical measures regarding his or her defense, counsel ultimately has the authority to make any such decisions after consultation
with the client.

56

Both the applicable precedent and the rules of professional responsibility assert that the authority to make decisions regarding the defense's
conduct in a criminal case is divided between the criminal defendants
themselves and their attorneys. 57 While a criminal defendant has the aubehalf. However, a lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage that
might be realized for a client. A lawyer has professional discretion in
determining the means by which a matter should be pursued.
Id. at Rule 1.3 cmt. 1.
54. See CIMINALJUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 34, at Standard 4-1.2 ("Counsel for the accused is an essential component of the administration of criminal
justice.").
55. Id. at Standard 4-3.6 cmt. The comment to Standard 4-3.6 of the ABA
Standards for CriminalJustice indicates that the standards do not mandate that a
lawyer is "obligated to take every step the cause demands." Id. Rather, "[c]ertain
decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ultimately for the accused and
others are ultimately for defense counsel." Id. at Standard 4-5.2(a).
56. Id. at Standard 4-5.2(b). The commentary states that "the power of decision in matters of trial strategy and tactics rests with the lawyer, after consultation
with the client when consultation is, in the lawyer's judgment, both feasible and
appropriate." Id. at cmt.
Notably, nowhere in the ABA Standardsfor CriminalJustice does it state what
course of action a lawyer must take when his client expresses a concern about
extra-record information in the possession of a juror. Id.
57. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). The Supreme Court in Jones
confronted the issue of whether it was within the defendant's rights and authority
to decide to waive a jury trial or to take an appeal. Id.
A New York state court convicted Barnes, nicknamed "Froggy," of robbery and
assault. Id. at 745. Froggy appealed and sought a new trial, asking his assigned
counsel, Melinger, to raise various issues. Id. Melinger did not raise all of the
issues that Froggy requested because he concluded that they either were not based
on evidence contained in the record or they would not have aided Froggy in obtaining a new trial. Id. Froggy raised the neglected issues in his pro se brief. Id.
The appellate court rejected each of his arguments, however, and affirmed the
conviction. Id.
Froggy then brought a federal habeas corpus action, claiming that Melinger's
failure to assert every nonfrivolous argument that Froggy had requested violated
his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Id. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed and outlined a new per se rule requiring
that appointed counsel for an indigent criminal defendant raise every nonfrivolous
issue raised by the client. Id. at 749 (citingJones v. Barnes, 665 F.2d 427, 443 (2d
Cir. 1981)).
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari. Id. Chief Justice Burger wrote,
"by promulgating a per se rule that the client must be allowed to decide what issues
are to be pressed, the Court of Appeals seriously undermine[s] the ability of counsel to present the client's case in accord with counsel's professional evaluation."
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thority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding his or her constitutional rights, he or she does not have a constitutional right to insist that
counsel advance every nonfrivolous argument. 5 8 Counsel does bear the
responsibility, however, of fully consulting with the client regarding
nonfundamental decisions, and is required to exercise professional judgment when making such decisions. 59 If counsel fails to consult with his or
her client on either fundamental or nonfundamental decisions, makes
Id. Moreover, Chief Justice Berger outlined that the imposition of a duty on appointed counsel "to raise every 'colorable' claim suggested by a client would disserve the very goal of vigorous and effective advocacy." Id. at 754.
The dissent responded that "[a]s in Faretta, to force a lawyer's decisions on a
defendant 'can only lead him to believe that the law contrives against him."' Id. at
762 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834
(1975)).
58. Id. at 751. Fundamental decisions recognized by the Jones court differ
slightly from the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. In Jones, the court
considered whether certain fundamental decisions are to be made by a criminal
defendant, such as: whether to plead guilty; whether to waive the right to a jury
trial; whether to testify on one's own behalf; whether to take an appeal; or whether
to waive the right to counsel. Id.
Likewise, the ABA Standardsfor CriminalJustice indicate that the accused must
be the party to make some decisions regarding the course of his or her defense,
after thorough consultation with counsel. CRIMINAIJuSTICE STANDARDS, supra note
34, at Standard 4-5.2(a). Such decisions include: what pleas should be entered,
whether to accept a plea agreement, whether to waive ajury trial, whether to testify
on his or her own behalf and whether to appeal. Id. at Standard 4-5.2(a) (i)-(v).
Thus, a criminal defendant has a constitutional right under the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses to an appeal, but he or she does not have a constitutional right to insist that his or her appellate counsel advance every nonfrivolous
argument that he or she suggests. Jones, 463 U.S. at 751.
59. Jones, 463 U.S. at 753 n.6. The Jones Court cited the 1982 edition of the
ABA Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct. Id. (citing MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (Final Draft 1982)). The 1996 edition of Rule 1.2(a) of the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct is identical to the 1982 edition cited by the
Supreme Court in Jones in 1983. Id. For the text of Rule 1.2(a), see supra note 36.

In other words, defense counsel bears the professional responsibility for the

conduct of the case and makes strategic and tactical decisions after consultation
with the defendant where feasible and appropriate. Jones, 463 U.S. at 753 n.6.
Rule 4-5.2 (b) of the ABA Standardsfor CriminalJustice states:
Strategic and tactical decisions should be made by defense counsel after
consultation with the client where feasible and appropriate. Such decisions include what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct crossexamination, what jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions should be
made, and what evidence should be introduced.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS,

supra note 34, at Standard 4-5.2(b).

The comment to Rule 4-5.2(b) of the ABA Standardsfor CriminalJustice cross
references Rule 1.2(a) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. at n.1
(citing MODEL RuLEs, supra note 36, at Rule 1.2(a)). Rule 1.2(a) states:
A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of
representation, subject to [other] paragraphs [of this rule] and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. ... In
a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive a
jury trial and whether the client will testify.
MODEL RuLEs, supra note 36, at Rule 1.2(a).
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strategic or tactical decisions without the requisite consultation or makes
decisions that are contrary to reasonable professional judgment, it is likely
that he or she will confront an ineffective assistance claim by the client
60
following ajury verdict.
C.

The Right that Is

The requirement that a jury be fair and impartial is inherent in the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.6 1 As a result, attorneys strive to
select impartial jurors that will sympathize with their client. 6 2 Nevertheless and regardless of the vigilant efforts made by an attorney to select an
Significantly, many of the strategic and tactical decisions that must be made in
the course of a criminal trial "do not allow, extended, if any, consultation." CmiMI-

supra note 34, at Standard 4-5.2 cmt.
60. Jones, 463 U.S. at 753 (noting that disparity between defense counsel and

NAL JUSTICE STANDARDS,

his or her client in decisions made before or during trial on major decision may be
substance of postconviction proceedings that question effectiveness of counsel's
performance); seeStano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 1142-43 (1lth Cir. 1991) (holding that defendant made voluntary, informed choice to plead guilty despite advice
of counsel); Via v. Superintendent, 643 F.2d 167, 175 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that
attorney who represented petitioner in criminal case was unprepared to try case
and failed to afford petitioner "representation 'within range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases"' (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 771 (1970))).
61. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("[T]he accused shall enjoy the right to a...
trial, by an impartial jury .... "); Elise E. Walthall, Casebrief, ConstitutionalLawThe Practicaland ProceduralImplications ofJury Misconduct in the Third Circuit, 39 VILL.
L. Rxv. 1005, 1006 (1994) (noting that constitutional right exists to have case tried
by impartial jury); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3, ("The trial of all [c]rimes
...shall be byjury .... "); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 27 (1972) (recognizing Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 462 (1938) (same); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66 (1932) (same). For a
general discussion of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel,
see supra note 1.
62. Amy Singer, Six Rules For Picking A Successful Juy, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT
LrrIGATIoN: 1995 at 375, 377 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 520, 1995). To dispel what often appears to be the mysterious way in
which juries decide cases, many trial lawyers have developed-and still hold dearseveral myths. Id. Many attorneys continue to subscribe to stereotypes even
though "objective, observable variables are actually the least predictive of jury behavior and verdicts" and may "antagonize empaneled jurors who sense that.., bias
has shaped the selection." Id. Examples of such stereotypes include: accountants
are stingy and should be kept on a case by an attorney who is defending against
large claims, African-Americans are liberal and defense counsel should keep them
off ajury when defending against large claims, or and if it is a wrongful death case,
older women are overly sympathetic, especially where children are concerned. Id.
Examples of stereotypes held by plaintiff's attorneys include: always pick the "little
guy"; avoid businesswomen; pick someone who has been injured; stay away from a
poor juror because they are incapable of thinking about the large sum of money
necessary for an "adequate award"; and never pick accountants. Gordon L. Roberts & Timothy R. Hanson, Jury Selection, 8 UTAH BJ. 14, 16 (1995); seeJames W.
McElhaney, Picking aJury, 2 LITIG. 43 (1992) (discussing myths and stereotypes in
jury voir dire). See generally id. at 43-44 (discussing and detailing history of stereotypes that exist injury selection and study of how well lawyers pick juries and "strategies" employed when doing so).
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impartial jury, the prevalence of media attention often makes obtaining a
jury that has no outside knowledge of the case unrealistic. 63 Thus, it is not
surprising that the Supreme Court, in the interest of furthering the possibility of obtaining an impartial jury, has held that even if a juror is not
completely ignorant of the facts and issues involved in a case, the juror
must be able to set aside individual impressions and opinions and render a
64
verdict based only on court-presented evidence.
According to statistics, demographics rarely determine verdicts or damage
awards as much as discrimination based on age, race, religion, gender, political
affiliation or profession-rarely and certainly not enough to necessitate a voir dire.
Singer, supra, at 377. Nonetheless, litigators make their jury selections and conduct their voir dire using stereotypes; in doing so they may dismiss someone who
would be very good for their side, who would push for an acquittal. Id. On the
other hand, they may keep someone who could cause them great harm, such as an
unfavorable verdict or conviction. Id.
Furthermore, "[b]eliefs are not contagious. People have them; you can't
change them, nor will others 'catch' or become 'contaminated' by them ...
'[v]alue beliefs' are, in fact, the only consistent predictors of jury verdicts." Id. at
379. Thus, some commentators argue that it is advisable simply to rely on individual judgment and client's intuition. Roberts & Hanson, supra, at 16.
63. Walthall, supra note 61, at 1007 n.8. When a case catches the public's
interest, it is even more difficult to obtain an impartial and untainted jury. Id.; see
Yount v. Patton, 710 F.2d 956, 969-72 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that right to fair trial
by impartial jury was obscured where widespread dissemination of extra-record information caused actual prejudice in jurors, warranting disregard of their assurances of impartiality). But see United States v. Morales, 815 F.2d 725, 730-39 (1st
Cir. 1987) (maintaining that defendants were not deprived of fair trial despite
widespread publicity concerning police shooting cover-up); United States v. Blanton, 719 F.2d 815, 833 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that trial judge secured impartial
jury despite negative pre-trial media publicity); United States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d
241, 249-55 (5th Cir. 1982) (maintaining that adverse pre-trial publicity did not
entitle defendant to reversal of conviction).
The majority view today is that it is near impossible to obtain a completely
impartial jury without knowledge of the case or the issues. Walthall, supra note 61,
at 1007 n.8. Regardless, lawyers continue to seek impartial juries consisting of jurors who have no exposure to the case at bar. Id. But see Toni M. Massaro,
Preemptories or Peers? Rethinking the Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images and Procedures,
64 N.C. L. Rv. 501, 564 n.216 (1986) (stating that "lawyers proclaim sanctimoniously that they only seek fair and impartial jury [sic], but pious protestations
aside, what they really want is ajury that will favor their side and help them win").
Massaro argues that neither attorneys nor parties to an action, really want a fair
jury; rather, they argue that attorneys strive for ajury that is selectively predisposed
to their position. Id.
64. Walthall, .supra note 61, at 1007 n.8 (discussing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717, 722-23 (1961)). Following his arrest in Dowd, the petitioner confessed to six
murders. Dowd, 366 U.S. at 717. There was extensive media coverage of the
murders and the confession. Id. Nonetheless, the court denied the petitioner's
request for change of venue, and ultimately the court vacated and remanded the
case because of juror bias. Id. at 729.
Ordinary citizens who have faith in the ideal of an impartial jury and litigators
who spend countless hours preparing opening statements, cross-examinations and
closing arguments with the belief that such dynamics impact a trial verdict, shudder at the thought that the selection of the jury is not only the most important part
of the trial, but is verdict determinative as well. Roberts & Hanson, supra note 62,

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997

19

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 6

294

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42: p. 275

Thus, extraneous influences on jurors and the consideration by ajury
of extra-record information violates the Sixth Amendment guarantee of
an impartial jury; the increased potential for a juror to have a preconceived notion as to the defendant's guilt or innocence, notwithstanding
evidence presented at trial, becomes great in the face of such influences
and information. 6 5 Such extraneous influences include media and publicity coverage, as well as communication by ajuror with a third party regarding a material issue in the case. 6 6 Nevertheless, the duty of a juror when
rendering a verdict is to consider only the evidence formally presented in
have received extra-record incourt, despite the possibility that they may
67
formation during the course of a trial.
at 14. Just as disconcerting is the idea that the trial is over once a jury is picked. Id.
at 14-15.
65. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 150 (3d Cir.
1975). The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to an impartialjury. Id. If the
jury considers evidence not introduced by the court, the jury's impartiality may be
compromised. Id. at 150-51.
Extra-record influences, including the media and other publicity, pose a
threat to fairness. Walthall, supra note 61, at 1012 n.28. In other words, extrarecord information "evades the safeguards of the judicial process." Id. (citing
United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684, 690 (3d Cir. 1993) (prohibiting premature
deliberations in criminal case); see also United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 840
(3d Cir. 1994) (noting that extraneous and extra-record information threatens occurrence of fair criminal proceeding).
66. Walthall, supra note 61, at 1011 n.26 (citing Dennis Edwards, Jr., A Judge's
Review of JurorMisconduct, 27 How. L.J. 1519, 1522 (1984) (describing several instances of juror misconduct and exposure to extra-record information)).
The conduct and deliberations of the jury should be without improper influences. Id. at 1008 n.ll; see Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229-30 (1954)
(holding that defendant was entitled to hearing to determine effect of remark
made to juror); Drew v. Collins, 964 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1992) (alleging jury
misconduct occurred when jury considered parole law during capital sentencing
deliberations); United States v. Tierney, 947 F.2d 854, 868 (8th Cir. 1991) (alleging juror misconduct occurred when juror slept and read magazines during trial);
United States v. Anello, 765 F.2d 253, 258 (1st Cir. 1985) (alleging occurrence of
juror misconduct when juror made remark to another juror before deliberations);
United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777, 783 (2d Cir. 1985) (alleging consideration of
extra-record evidence during deliberations constituted juror misconduct); United
States v. Largo, 346 F.2d 253, 254 (7th Cir. 1965) (allegingjuror misconduct when
jurors read article about defendant during ongoing trial).
67. Walthall, supra note 63, at 1010-11 & n.24 (citing EDwARD J. DEvrrr &
CHARLEs B. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 1.01 (3d ed.
1987)). See Resko, 3 F.3d at 689 (citing examples of extra-jury misconduct); Gereau,
523 F.2d at 150 (listing types of extra-jury influences); see also United States v. Bass,
10 F.3d 256, 257-58 (5th Cir. 1993) (claiming jurors exposed to mid-trial media
account of case); United States v. Ortiz-Arrigoitia, 996 F.2d 436, 443 (1st Cir. 1993)
(holding defendants not entitled to mistrial for jury misconduct when juror discussed case with his daughter); United States v. Small, 891 F.2d 53, 54 (3d Cir.
1989) (finding defendant's conviction not seriously affected by fact that trial transcript containing prejudicial sidebar conference was mistakenly shown to jury during deliberations); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 814 F.2d 134, 135
(3d Cir. 1987) (asserting jury exposure to extra-record information concerning
facts of case and defendant's past criminal record amounted to error), aff'd sub
nom. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990); Doggett v. Yeager, 472 F.2d

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss1/6

20

Cirilla: A Caribbean Fantasy - The Case of the Juror Who Misbehaved and th

1997]

NOTE
III.

295

FACTS

In Government of the Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, William Weatherwax

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus for ineffective assistance of counsel, stemming from his March 1989 murder trial during which a juror allegedly became prejudiced. 68 After several witnesses observed one of the
jurors carrying a newspaper into the courtroom which contained an article
about the trial, Weatherwax urged his attorney, Michael Joseph, to call the
prejudice to the attention of the court, but Joseph failed to comply with
69
his client's request.
229, 233 (3d Cir. 1973) (alleging juror misconduct because of likelihood that
newspaper article about defendant's retraction of guilty plea seen by jurors).
68. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, No. CRIM.88-139, 1993
WL 835624, at *1 (D.V.I. Feb. 19, 1993), rev'd, 77 F.3d 1425 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 538 (1996). Weatherwax did not deny shooting St. Clair Hazel, the
victim, but claimed it was in self-defense and that the gun accidentally discharged.
Id.
Hazel was an African-American male and Weatherwax, the defendant, was
Caucasian. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d 1425, 1428
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 538 (1996). The jury consisted of three Caucasian
jurors. Id. This was very unusual for a Virgin Islands jury because the vast majority
of the population is African-American. Id. Weatherwax's attorney, Michael Joseph, was delighted with the makeup of the jury and anticipated a better chance
for a favorable defense verdict on the basis of shared juror-defendant race. Id. at
1430. For a discussion of the occurrence which threatened the loss of this "dream
jury," see supra notes 14, 69 and accompanying text.
69. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1435. On the final day of the trial, a defense witness and members of Weatherwax's family observed one of the jurors carrying a St.
Croix daily newspaper into the courtroom. Appellee's Petition for Rehearing, Ex.
A, at 1, Government of the Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d 1425 (3d Cir.
1996) (No. 95-7126) (affidavit of C. Black). One witness, Charles Black, was subpoenaed byJoseph to attend Weatherwax's trial. Id. He was to serve as a character
witness for Weatherwax who he had known him for several years. Id. He was also
subpoenaed to assist in Weatherwax's defense as a ballistics expert. Id. Black
stated that, on the final day of the trial, he observed a white male juror carrying a
St. Croix newspaper, the St. Croix Avis, from the deliberation room into the courtroom. Id.; Appellee's Petition, Ex. B, at 1, Weatherwax (No. 95-7126) (second affidavit of C. Black).
This so-called newspaper incident occurred on the third day of Weatherwax's
trial when page three of the St. Croix Avis, purporting to highlight the defense
testimony from the second day of trial, carried the headline, "Weathenoax: I Cocked
Hammerand Took Aim" Id. (citing Charles Fisher, Weatherwax: I Cocked Hammerand
Took Aim, ST. CROIX Avis, Mar. 9, 1989, at 3, 11); see also Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1427
n.1 (noting that newspaper article did not report extra-record information). The
article first recalled the prosecution's "dramatic display" of a handgun allegedly
used by Weatherwax in the murder of Hazel, and then reported follow-up questioning. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 20 F.3d 572, 577 (3d
Cir. 1994), rev'd, 77 F.3d 1425 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 538 (1996).
Black approached Joseph, informed Joseph of his observation and pointed
out the juror in question. Appellee's Petition, Ex. A, at 1, Weatherwax (No. 95-7126)
(affidavit of Black). According to Black, Joseph acknowledged the presence of the
newspaper, but was apprehensive about bringing the presence of the newspaper to
the court's attention. Id. Black's affidavit states that Joseph said that he would
make a motion for a mistrial at that time, but he failed to do so. Id. Joseph did not
file a motion for a mistrial the following day. Id.
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On direct appeal from the United States District Court of the Virgin
70
Islands, the Third Circuit affirmed Weatherwax's murder conviction.
Weatherwax then filed a petition for habeas corpus, claiming ineffective
Sallie Lay, Weatherwax's sister, also attended the trial. Id. Ex. C, at 1, Weatherwax (No. 95-7126) (affidavit of S. Lay). She also saw the Caucasian male juror walk
out of the jury deliberation room holding a newspaper. Id. She reported her observation to the United States Marshall, but he did not take the newspaper from
the juror, nor did he question the juror regarding his possession of the newspaper.
Id. According to Lay, Joseph said he would file a motion the next day, but "not to
worry" because the juror was "the foreman of the jury, on our (Weatherwax's) side,
not to bring any attention to it. It would only-hurt Billy's case." Id. She stated that
she, her husband, Black, Weatherwax and John Miller all told Joseph to "file a
motion" or "do something," but they did not pursue the issue afterJoseph said he
would file a motion for mistrial. Id. Ex. D, at 1, Weatherwax (No. 95-7126) (second
affidavit of S. Lay).
Each person who observed the incident asked Weatherwax's defense attorney,
Joseph, to file a motion for a mistrial. Id. Ex. A, at 1, Weatherwax (No. 95-7126)
(affidavit of Black); id. Ex. D, at 1 (affidavit of S. Lay). William Lay, Danny Ray
Leonard and John Leonard all made statements similar to Black's and Lay's,
namely that they saw a Caucasian male juror carrying a newspaper from the deliberation room to the courtroom on the final day of the trial and that when they
approached Joseph with the information, he stated that he would file a motion but
failed to do so on both the day in question and on the following day. See generally
id. Ex. E, at 1, Weatherwax (No. 95-7126) (affidavit of W. Lay) (indicating that juror
was observed carrying newspaper and Joseph failed to file promised motion for
mistrial); id. Ex. F, at 1 (affidavit of Leonard) (same); id. Ex. G, at 1 (second affidavit of Leonard) (same); id. Ex. H, at 1 (third affidavit of Leonard) (same); id. Ex. I,
at 1 (affidavit of Miller) (same); id. Ex. J, at 1 (second affidavit of Miller) (same).
Joseph did not file the motion on the final day of trial, nor did he file it the
next day. Appellee's Brief at 4, Government of the Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax,
77 F.3d 1425 (3d Cir. 1996) (No. 95-7126). In fact, he never filed a motion of any
kind despite Weatherwax's repeated requests that he do so. Id. During the trial,
the judge warned the jury "not to read or review any media accounts of the Weatherwax trial." Id. The judge stressed the importance of reaching a decision based
solely on the facts admitted into the evidence during trial. Id. Specifically, the
judge emphasized that the jury not be influenced by extraneous information. Id.
When the juror was observed leaving the jury room with a local newspaper,
Weatherwax and his family members, among others, asked Joseph to "do something" about the juror's violation of the judge's admonitions. Id. Joseph, however,
did not follow Weatherwax's instructions to "bring the violation of the trial court's
instruction to its attention and did not follow up on his commitment to his client
that he would 'do something about it'." Id. In fact, even after the jury returned a
verdict sentencing Weatherwax to several years in prison on two criminal counts,
Joseph failed to bring the newspaper incident to the attention of the court. Id. at
5.
Ultimately, the jury convicted Weatherwax of second degree murder and unlawful possession of a weapon. Id. The trial court sentenced Weatherwax to 25
years in prison for second degree murder and five years for unlawful possession of
a weapon. Id. The jury acquitted him of first degree murder. Id. Weatherwax is
now serving time in an Oklahoma prison. Appellant's Brief at 3, Government of
the Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d 1425 (3d Cir. 1996) (No. 95-7126).
70. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 893 F.2d 1329 (3d Cir.
1989). The same court which affirmed the second degree murder conviction and
unlawful weapon possession conviction decided the case that is the subject of this
Note. Id.; cf. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1425 (holding counsel did not render ineffective assistance).
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assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. 71 The
district court denied Weatherwax's motion without a hearing, and he appealed. 72 In response, the Third Circuit found that Weatherwax was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim for ineffective assistance of
7
counsel. 3
71. Weatherwax, 1993 WL 835624, at *1.Weatherwax filed his petition pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which provides: "A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released
upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or
the laws of the United States ...may move the court which imposed the sentence
to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994)).
Weatherwax alleged that both his trial and appellate counsel failed to provide
him with effective assistance. Weatherwax, 1993 WL 835624, at *1. In his petition,
Weatherwax contended that his attorney, Michael Joseph: (1) failed to respond to
the Government's attack on the reputation for truthfulness of Weatherwax's son;
(2) failed to obtain Hazel's FBI record as evidence of Hazel's reputation for vio-

lence; (3) failed to call the court's attention to juror misconduct when members
of Weatherwax's family and Weatherwax himself told Joseph that a juror had entered the juryroom with a newspaper including an article about the trial and the
family members and Weatherwax asked Joseph to "do something"; (4) failed to
properly handle inappropriate conduct of the court clerk; and (5) failed to object
to instances of the prosecutor's misconduct. Id. at *1-3.
72. Weatherwax, 1993 WL 835624, at *1-3; Weatherwax, 20 F.3d at 573. The
district court characterized the newspaper as a "verbatim and dispassionate account of the testimony adduced at trial." Weatherwax, 1993 WL 835624, at *2.
Thus, the district court concluded that the reading of the testimony in a newspaper could not be prejudicial to the jury members, and, therefore,Joseph's decision
not to bring the incident to the attention of the trial court was tactical and insufficient to support an ineffectiveness claim. Id. The court of appeals vacated and
remanded the case back to the district court. Weatherwax, 20 F.3d at 573. Focusing
on the ineffectiveness of counsel claim, the Third Circuit stated that "[b]ecause
this allegation, if proven, would constitute grounds for habeas relief, assuming
counsel did not have a strategic reason for failing to request voir dire, we will vacate
the order dismissing the writ and remand the matter to the district court to con-

duct an evidentiary hearing on this issue." Id.
The Third Circuit indicated that if the district court found that a juror had
brought a newspaper into the deliberation and attorney Joseph had known of the
occurrence, then Weatherwax would have "made out a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland standard." Id. at 580. The Third
Circuit further indicated that if Weatherwax could have established a prima facie

case, then the Government must be permitted to question Joseph in relation to his
failure to conduct a voir dire to establish that Joseph "proceeded on the basis of

'sound trial strategy."' Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)). For a
further discussion of Strickland, see supra notes 38-46.
73. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 574. The district court focused its consideration of
the case on Weatherwax's claim that defense counsel failed to request a voir dire to
determine the impact of extraneous information on the jury, when one of the
juror's brought a local newspaper into the deliberation room. Id. The Third Circuit then vacated and remanded the case to the district court. Id. In doing so, it
remanded the matter so that the district court could conduct an evidentiary hear-

ing on the issue. Id. at 573. The court of appeals recognized that if the ineffectiveness of counsel allegations were proven, there would be grounds for habeas relief
"assuming counsel did not have a strategic reason for failing to request voir dire."
Id.
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On remand from the Third Circuit, the district court determined that
the performance of Weatherwax's attorney was defective, unreasonable
and contrary to prevailing professional norms. 74 The court issued the petition for habeas relief and ordered that the Government either retry
The Third Circuit fully discussed the newspaper article in the juror's possession and examined the possible impact it could have had on the verdict against
Weatherwax. Id. at 574. The court ultimately concluded that Weatherwax's testimony argued against second degree murder and supported his self-defense testimony, while the newspaper article did neither. Id. at 577.
Thus, the Third Circuit disagreed with the district court's decision that the
newspaper article was a "verbatim and dispassionate account of the testimony adduced at trial." Id. at 575. Rather, it recognized that the actual trial testimony
varied significantly from the newspaper article. See id. (citing exact language from
newspaper article and trial transcript). The appellate court concluded that the
overall substance of the newspaper article created a markedly different version of
Weatherwax's testimony. Weatherwax, 20 F.3d at 577. Although the difference in
the actual testimony and the newspaper report was slight, it was significant enough
that the jurors may have noticed. Id. Thus, the court concluded that damage was
likely to have been inflicted on the juror's perception of the defense as a result of
the article's account of Weatherwax's testimony. Id. The court stated, "[i]f the
jurors ... read the damaging article with its distorted reporting of Weatherwax's
testimony, the likelihood of resulting taint to the fairness of the trial [would be]
apparent" and Weatherwax would have been prejudiced by the partial jury. Id. at
580. In addition, in referring to the pro-prosecution slant given to the trial by the
newspaper article, the court stated:
A reader of the article would reasonably conclude that, on the night of
the shooting, [Weatherwax] had testified that he cocked the hammer
and aimed the gun at Hazel as he walked toward Weatherwax. The last
sentence quoted from Weatherwax's testimony conveys the impression
that Weatherwax became confused, stopped his narrative, and questioned
the import of the prosecution's question. A careful dissection of the article, however, demonstrates how this [newspaper] account skewed both
the content and the chronology of the testimony.
Id. at 576.
Although the headline and article quoted Weatherwax as testifying, "I cocked
the hammer and took aim," Weatherwax never made that statement. Id. As such,
the newspaper's misuse of the tense of the word "cock" distorted the import of
Weatherwax's statement. Id. at 576-77. He actually testified that he did not handle the gun on the night of the murder in his customary manner. Id. When asked
by the prosecuting attorney how he usually fired the gun, Weatherwax replied "I
cock the hammer and took aim." Id. at 576. Weatherwax did not testify to his
handling of the weapon on the night of the shooting; rather, he "described his
priorhandling of the gun." Id.
Another harmful error in the newspaper's account of the trial testimony occurred in its description of a later exchange between the prosecutor and Weatherwax. Id. The prosecutor asked Weatherwax: "You didn't cock the hammer by
accident, did you?" Id. The newspaper misrepresented Weatherwax's reply and
reported: "I pointed the gun right at him ....
" Id. In truth, Weatherwax did not
answer the prosecutor's question with the reported response. Id. In fact, Weatherwax's reported answer was an excerpt from his direct examination narrative regarding the events of the evening in question and "did not arise in the context of
cocking the hammer." Id. (emphasis added). Finally, the Third Circuit noted that
the article "erroneously structured the order of the questioning." Id.
74. Weatherwax v. Government of the Virgin Islands, No. CRIM.88-0139, 1995
WL 55114, at *1 (D.V.I. Feb. 6, 1995), rev'd, 77 F.3d 1425 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 538 (1996) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). For a discussion of the in-
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Weatherwax within seventy days from the date of the judgment or release
him from incarceration. 75 The Government appealed, and the Third Circuit reversed and remanded the district court order with instructions that
76
Weatherwax's petition for habeas relief be denied.

ANALYsis:

GoERmvMENT OF THE VIRGIN.ISLANDS V. WEA T-HERWAX

A.

NarrativeAnalysis

In Weatherwax, the Third Circuit confronted a Sixth Amendment issue. 77 Specifically, the court addressed a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, resulting from a defense attorney's failure to investigate the possible impact on the jury of extra-record information regarding his or her
structions given to the district court on remand from the Third Circuit, see supra
note 72.
The district court considered whether: (1) Weatherwax's trial counsel,
Michael Joseph, employed "sound trial strategy" when he failed to inform the
court of his decision and failed to request a voir dire of a juror who was observed
possessing a newspaper, despite the court's admonition to avoid reading newspaper articles concerning the trial and (2) whether this failure constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel so as to warrant a new trial. Weatherwax, 1995 WL 55114, at
*1. The district court held thatJoseph did not meet the burden of proving that his
failure to conduct a voir dire was a strategic trial tactic. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689). On remand, the Government conceded that a juror had possessed a
newspaper and that Joseph knew of the possession. Id. Accordingly, it was determined that Weatherwax made out a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of
counsel under Stricklandand that the burden therefore shifted to the Government
to prove that although Joseph's assistance was defective and unreasonable under
.prevailing professional norms," the decision not to conduct a voir dire of the jury
was the basis of a "sound trial strategy" procured by defense attorney Joseph. Id.
75. Weathenvax, 1995 WL 55114, at *7. The district court found that when
Joseph failed to request a voir dire of the jury, he failed to employ "sound trial
strategy." Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686). Thus, Weatherwax satisfied the
first prong of the Strickland test; that is, Weatherwax established that Joseph rendered defective assistance. Id. Furthermore, the district court excused Weatherwax from having to prove the prejudice prong of Strickland. Id. Because a voir dire
was not conducted, there existed no objective criteria upon which the court could
determine prejudice. Id. For a discussion of Strickland and the standard established for evaluating effective assistance of counsel, see supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
76. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d 1425 (3d Cir.),
c.rt denied, 117 S. Ct. 538 (1996). Specifically, the court held that: (1) Attorney
Joseph's decision not to move for a mistrial, or to bring to light the fact that ajuror
had been observed carrying a newspaper containing an article about the trial to
the attention of the court, was a reasonable tactical decision; (2) the decision
whether to bring the matter to the attention of the court was not a fundamental
decision that the defendant had a right to make; (3) counsel had not failed to
consult with Weatherwax before making the decision; and (4) a breach by counsel
of a duty as an officer of the court to alert to the court to the juror's actions did
not entitle petitioner to relief from conviction. Id.
77. Id. at 1426-27. For an explanation of the issues confronted by the Third
Circuit, see infra note 79. For a discussion of the facts and procedural history of
Weatherwax, see supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
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client.78 The Virgin Islands District Court held that Weatherwax's attorney, Michael Joseph, breached his professional duties to Weatherwax in
two ways. First, Joseph failed to take steps necessary to secure a voir dire
inquiry to determine if the newspaper in fact had prejudiced the jury. 79
Second, Joseph failed to consult with or follow directions from Weatherwax regarding strategic matters.80 The Third Circuit disagreed with the
district court's findings regarding an attorney's duty to consult with his or
her client, and instead, conducted its analysis of the issue pursuant to the
Strickland standard.8 '
1.

Considering Counsel's Strategic Decision

In its determination of whetherJoseph rendered ineffective assistance
of counsel to Weatherwax, the Third Circuit first considered the teachings
set forth in Strickland 82 The Weatherwax court initially recognized that the
78. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1425, 1431. The Third Circuit confronted the issue
on appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands. Id. at 1426.
79. Id. at 1431. The lower court reasoned that Joseph breached his duty to
Weatherwax because he failed to conduct a voir dire in response to the possibility
of a prejudiced jury. Id. Because Joseph failed to notify the court of the newspaper incident, he deprived the court of the opportunity to ascertain the content of
the juror's exposure. Id. at 1430.
The district court stated: "The rule ... as repeatedly stressed by our Court of

Appeals, [is that] whenever the integrity of the jury's deliberations is jeopardized,
the trial court 'is required to conduct a voir dire of the jury that would permit [it]
to evaluate the potential prejudice to the defendant."' Weatherwax, 1995 WL
55114, at *5 (quoting Government of the Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 814 F.2d 134,
138 (3d Cir. 1987), affd, 493 U.S. 342 (1990)) (second alteration in original),
rer'd,77 F.3d 1425 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 538 (1996); seeDowling, 814
F.2d at 137-38, afrd, 493 U.S. 342 (1990) (holding that declining to question jurors
was not abuse of trial court's discretion, despite judge's receipt of note from juror
that another juror had been exposed to extra-record information); see also Waldorf
v. Shuta, 3 F.3d 705, 713 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that jurors' own assessments of
impartiality were not sufficient to insure that damages awarded were based on evidence introduced at trial and not on jury's exposure to extrajudicial information);
United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684, 694 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding district court erred
by refusing to conduct searching inquiry into potential prejudice from jury
misconduct).
80. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1431. The district court held thatJoseph breached
his duty as defense counsel for Weatherwax because Joseph did not heed the requests of Weatherwax or his family members to call the court's attention to the fact
that one of the jurors was found leaving the deliberation room with a newspaper
containing a transcript of Weatherwax's testimony. Id. at 1427, 1431.
For a discussion of the district court's decision and the reasoning therein, see
supra note 68. For a discussion of the prejudicial newspaper article, see supra note
69.
81. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1431. For a complete discussion of the Third Circuit's holding in Weatherwax, see supra notes 77-80, infta notes 82-107 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of Strickland, see supra notes 38-46 and
accompany text.
82. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1431. Attorney Joseph explained to Weatherwax
his strategy in selecting a jury. Id. at 1428. Joseph based his strategy: (1) on the
fact that Weatherwax's case had created a racial charge in the Virgin Islands be-
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performance inquiry considers whether counsel's assistance was reasonable at the time counsel rendered performance, in light of all the surrounding circumstances.8 3 Because of the invariably unpredictable
circumstances that occur during trial, however, the Weatherwax court carefully avoided adopting a single set of standards that would dictate attorney
8 4
conduct regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.
The Third Circuit first looked to the holdings of other courts, many
of which have held that the authority to make decisions regarding the
course of defense at trial is split between counsel and the defendant.8 5 In
light of these decisions, the Third Circuit considered the district court's
holding that Joseph breached his duty when he failed to fully consult with
Weatherwax as to the decision not to inform the court of possible jury
bias.8 6 Thus, the Third Circuit demonstrated a high degree of deference
cause Weatherwax was Caucasian and (2) on the facts surrounding the victim's
death and Weatherwax's anticipated self-defense claim. Id.
83. Id. at 1431 (referring to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89
(1984)). For a thorough discussion of Strickland and the rationale therein, see
supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
84. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1431. Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that
"'[a] ny such set of rules would interfere with the constitutionally protected inde-

pendence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making
tactical decisions."' Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89). The Court found
that prevailing norms of legal practice reflected in the ABA Standardsfor Criminal
Justiceand the comments of the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct are strong indicators of what is acceptable and reasonable in the profession, but they do not discretely set forth rules to which counsel must abide. Id. No particular set of
detailed rules for attorney conduct can adequately account for the varying circumstances faced by defense counsel during trial or the "range of legitimate decisions
regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant." Id. (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689).
While professional standards provide a great deal of useful guidance in evaluating counsel's performance, the standards do not and cannot define the "boundary between constitutionally acceptable and constitutionally unacceptable
performance." Id.; see also id. at n.2 (citing Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165
(1986)) (noting breach of ethical standard does not automatically imply denial of
constitutional guarantee under Sixth Amendment).
Strickland also recognized that the use of specific guidelines to define the effectiveness of counsel are not appropriate. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. For a discussion of the Strickland court's assessment of reasonable representation of counsel
see supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
85. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1433 (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751
(1983); United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1531 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 842 (1992)).
86. Id. (citing Barnes, 463 U.S. at 754) (stating defense counsel does not have
duty to raise every nonfrivolous argument requested by defendant); cf Teague, 953
F.2d at 1531 (holding that right to testify is fundamental right of defendant that
cannot be waived by attorney); STANDARDS FOR CIMINMAL JUsTICE, supranote 36, at
Standard 4-5.2 (stating that "strategic and tactical decisions should be made by
defense counsel after consultation with the client").
When analyzing this issue, the court in Weatherwax discussed the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct and the ABA Standardsfor CriminalJustice. Weatherwax,
77 F.3d at 1433-34. Basically, the court concluded that: (1) certain fundamental
decisions are to be made by the client after consultation with counsel; (2) that
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in scrutinizing Joseph's performance, as exemplified by its discussion of
the possibility that even ifJoseph failed the Strickland test, he was justified
87
in doing so because he made a strategic decision.
While the Third Circuit still maintained that fundamental decisions
must ultimately be made by the client, the court also concluded that Joseph did not breach his duty as counsel by not informing the court of
possible jury prejudice as a result of the newspaper incident. 88 Rather, the
certain nonfundamental decisions are to be made by counsel after consultation
with the client; and (3) strategic or tactical decisions regarding the course of the
defense are to be made by counsel after consultation with the client if appropriate
and feasible. Id. Thus, an attorney making strategic or tactical decisions must
make them according to "reasonable professional judgment." Id. For further discussion of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the ABA Standards of
CriminalJustice, see supranotes 34, 36, 53-56, infra notes 131-53 and accompanying
text.
87. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1431-32. The states also have an interest in not
restricting the range of attorney conduct acceptable under the Sixth Amendment-narrowly defining the range of acceptable conduct would "intrude into the
state's proper authority to define and apply the standards of professional conduct
applicable to those it admits to practice in its courts." Id. at 1431 n.2 (quoting Nix,
475 U.S. at 165 n.10).
"'[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary."' Id. at 1432 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). An attorney who makes a strategic decision on an
incomplete investigation of the surrounding circumstances is able to make such a
decision based on the incomplete investigation, as long as the choice to do so is
"'reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation."' Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). In
effect, attorney Joseph made his strategic decision not to move for a mistrial after a
"less than complete investigation." Id.; see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93
(1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (recognizing that defendant's attorney is entrusted to "make on-the-spot decisions at virtually all stages of a criminal trial," but
counsel cannot waive defendant's fundamental, constitutionally dictated rights);
Routly v. Singletary, 33 F.3d 1279, 1289 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding decision by
counsel not to move for mistrial was "deliberate tactical choice"), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 2627 (1995); United States v. McGill, 11 F.3d 223, 226-27 (1st Cir. 1993) (maintaining that listening to client in lieu of making reasonable decision under prevailing professional norms may constitute incompetence); Meeks v. Bergen, 749 F.2d
322, 328 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding choice of which defense to assert is strategic
decision to be made by defense counsel); United States v. Long, 674 F.2d 848, 855
(1 th Cir. 1982) ("This Court will not second-guess tactical decisions of counsel in
deciding whether to call certain witnesses."); State v. Davis, 506 A.2d 86, 89-90
(Conn. 1986) (holding decision of which witnesses to call is commonly regarded as
tactical, strategic decision).
88. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1435. The district court held "that Joseph was required to follow Weatherwax's direct instruction to 'do something,' such as 'file a
motion."' Id. The Third Circuit, however, reversed and held that Joseph was not
required to follow Weatherwax's requests with respect to the incident at issue. Id.
at 1438.
According to the Weatherwax court, the client makes such decisions because
they are fundamental to the course of the client's fate. Id. at 1435. Some fundamental decisions relate directly to representation objectives, while other fundamental decisions are strategic decisions that "relate to the means employed by the
defense to obtain the primary object of the representation." Id. The court noted
that some fundamental decisions, such as whether to take an appeal or whether to
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court determined thatJoseph made a strategic decision not to inform the
trial court and that his decision did, in fact, concern the means utilized by
defense counsel to reach his and Weatherwax's mutual goal-acquittal of
first degree murder. 89 In this regard, the court stated that "a lawyer 'is not
required to ... employ means simply because a client may wish that the
lawyer do so.' -90 Accordingly, the Third Circuit indicated that whether to
inform the court of the newspaper incident was not a fundamental decision left to the discretion and authority of Weatherwax. 9 1 Thus, despite
Weatherwax's request that Joseph disclose the incident to the trial court,
Joseph was not compelled to heed his request. 92 As such, the court held
plead guilty, must be made by the defendant because "only the defendant knows
whether she prefers to bear" the likely consequences of those decisions. Id.
89. Id. The Weatherwax court stated, 'Joseph's decision concerned only the
means employed by the defense to reach that agreed-upon goal." Id. (emphasis
added). The court determined that at the point in the trial at which Joseph made
his decision, the decision did not directly relate to the objectives of the representation. Id.
Many fundamental decisions are viewed as strategic decisions. Id. These include whether to forego assistance of counsel, whether to waive a jury trial or
whether to testify on one's own behalf. Id. Such decisions are considered strategic
because they "relate to the means employed by the defense to obtain the primary
object of the representation." Id. The personal nature of these strategic decisions
are as important as those decisions deciding the objectives of representation. Id.
In other words, the client ultimately makes some strategic decisions. Id.
90. Id. (quoting MODEL RuLEs, supra note 36, at Rule 1.2(a)). The Weatherwax
court maintained that Joseph did not encroach upon on Weatherwax's authority:
[T]o make a fundamental personal decision comparable to decisions on
whether to forego assistance of counsel, to waive a jury trial, or to testify
in one's own behalf. Instead, Joseph's decision concerned whether he
should object once he learned that a distorted newspaper account of the
trial testimony may have made its way to the jury. It was clearly an important decision, but it was not one where respect for the individual's autonomy requires us to disregard the desirability of having professional
judgment exercised in the client's best interest.
Id.
91. Id. at 1433, 1435. The district court found that attorney Joseph rendered
ineffective representation when he "failed to follow direction from or fully consult
with" Weatherwax, who requested that the incident be brought to the court's at-

tention. Id. at 1433. Moreover, the court stated: "Whether to file a motion in this
context was not a 'fundamental decision[ ] regarding the case.' Wherever the precise line between client and counsel decision-making should be drawn, this decision fell squarely within the realm of strategy and tactics and thus was a decision
forJoseph to make." Id. at 1435 (quotingJones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 746, 751 (1983)
(alteration in original)). For a discussion of whether the client or the attorney has
the authority to make decisions during the course of a trial, see supra notes 56-60.
92. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1435. Joseph had only limited information with
which to make his decision at the time he was confronted with having to decide
whether to call the court's attention to the newspaper incident. Id. at 1432. Joseph knew only that someone saw ajuror with a newspaper containing a potentially
damaging article. Id. Joseph also truly believed that he could not possibly obtain a
jury that would be more favorable to Weatherwax. Id. The Third Circuit did not
view Joseph's decision as unreasonable, and therefore determined that his "decision not to inform the court was reasonable 'under prevailing professional
norms.'" Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Furthermore, the court held

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997

29

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 6
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42: p. 275

that Joseph acted within the scope of his authority in choosing to forego
93
informing the trial court of the incident.
Moreover, the Third Circuit recognized that Joseph made a strategic
decision not to move for a mistrial "after less than complete investigation,"
and after having failed to conduct a voir dire into the impact of extrarecord information on the jury. 94 Regardless, the Weatherwax court sympathat the decision not to inform the trial court of the possiblejury prejudice is "'the
exclusive province of the lawyer,"' and because Joseph had a rational basis in making the decision, the district court did not have the authority to "second-guess
counsel's judgment call." Id. at 1436 (quoting CR1MINALJUSTICE STANDARDS, supra
note 34, at Standard § 4-502(b)).
The crux of the Third Circuit's analysis focused on a balance between the
consequences that would result from Joseph informing the trial court of the incident and those that would result from him not informing the court. Id. The court
analogized Joseph's decision not to draw attention to the possibility of jury prejudice, to a strategic choice not to object to the admission of inadmissible hearsay
evidence by the prosecution. Id. "In both situations, the consequence of a failure
to object is that the jury will (or in Weatherwax's case might) learn information
untested by the adversarial process that it would not otherwise have learned," and
in both situations, the defense attorney is able to prevent the jury from learning
such information. Id. Instead, the court noted that defense counsel may decide
when it is "strategically advantageous" not to object, and that "in neither instance is
the defendant's right to a jury trial implicated." Id.
93. Id. at 1432. The Third Circuit, holding that Joseph acted within his authority when he failed to conduct a voir dire in order to determine the impact of
the newspaper article on the jurors' states of mind, likened the incident at issue to
witness selection, which is among the "non-fundamental decisions that counsel is
entitled to make at trial." Id. at 1434.
94. Id. at 1432. Joseph decided that the better course of action was to keep
the jury unaltered, without inquiring into the effect of the newspaper article on
the jurors' states of mind. Id.
Generally, in each "'case where the trial court learns that a member or members of the jury may have received extra-record information with a potential for
substantial prejudice, the trial court must determine whether the members of the
jury have been prejudiced."' Id. at 1432 n.3 (quoting Government of the Virgin
Islands v. Dowling, 814 F.2d 134, 139 (3d Cir. 1987), aff'd sub nom. Dowling v.
United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990)). Joseph, however, deliberately did not bring
the possibility of prejudice to the trial court's attention; his decision not to investigate the possibility ofjuror prejudice was, in itself, a strategic decision. Id. at 1432.
If Joseph had conducted an investigation into the newspaper incident, he would

have inevitably brought the incident to the court's attention. Id. Furthermore, if
Joseph had brought the newspaper article to the trial court's attention, the court
would have been obligated to conduct a voir dire and would have had full discretion to excuse some of the jurors or declare a mistrial. Id. at n.3. Essentially, if the
court had notice of juror misconduct, then Joseph would have been forced to re-

linquish some control over whether the jury would remain. Id. at 1432.
Furthermore, to have declared a mistrial would have brought more publicity
to the trial, and the chances of obtaining impartial jurors a second time would
have been next to impossible. See id. at 1428 (referring to Joseph's jury selection
and trial strategy). For further discussion on the difficulty of obtaining an impartial jury, see supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
Almost all trial lawyers agree as to the difficulty of getting an impartial jury.
Emily M. DeFalla, Note, Voir Direfor California's Civil Trials: Applying the Williams
Standard, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 517, 517 (1988); see also Alfredo Garcia, Clash of the Titans: The Difficult Reconciliation of a Fair Trial and a Free Press in Modern American
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thized with Joseph's fear that if he called the trial court's attention to the
newspaper incident, he would have risked a mistrial. 95 In doing so, the
court maintained that Joseph made a decision that any other competent
96
litigator would have made under similar circumstances.
Society, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1107, 1109-10 (1992) (stating that media influence
on jurors and problem of extraneous information existed over 100 years ago during Aaron Burr's murder trial); Note, Beyond Batson: Eliminating Gender-Based Preemptoy Challenges, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1920, 1930 (1992) (stating that preemptory
challenges based on gender do not materially advance conceptions ofjury impartiality); Karen A. Cusenbary, Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Voir Dire-A Trial Court's Refusal to Question ProspectiveJurorsAbout the Specific Contents of PretrialPublicity Which
They Had Read or Heard Did Not Violate Defendant's Sixth Amendment Right to an ImpartialJury, or Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process, 23 ST. MARY's L.J. 541, 543
(1991) (discussing right to impartial jury and procedure of assuring constitutional

rights as addressed in Mu'min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991)). The trial lawyers'
concerns are not only with regard to common knowledge about the case, but also

include the opinions and attitudes that jurors bring into the courtroom. Walthall,
supra note 61, at 1109.
95. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1432 n.3. In Weatherwax, the court sided with Joseph and maintained that "the decision not to inform the court was reasonable
'under prevailing professional norms.'" Id. at 1432 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
688).
Joseph made the decision that it was preferable for Weatherwax to be tried by

the current jury consisting of three Caucasian jurors (one possibly biased from the
newspaper article), rather than by a new jury, which would almost definitely consist

of all African-American jurors. Id. at 1432 n.4.
Joseph acknowledged that the facts of Weatherwax were not in dispute; thus,
the advantage of the defense would lie only in the jury that would hear and interpret the facts. Id. As such, the piece of evidence that Joseph most wanted to impress upon the jury was Weatherwax's perception of what happened to him on the
night of the shooting. Id.
With this in mind, Joseph carefully considered the strategy he would use in
selecting a jury. Id. His first strategy was based on two facts. First, that because
Weatherwax was Caucasian and a "Continental," who killed an African-American
male that was a native of the Virgin Islands, the "case had created a racially
charged atmosphere in the Virgin Islands." Id. Second, Weatherwax intended to
claim self-defense. Id. In light of these facts, Joseph decided to select ajury based
on sympathy, that is, he intended to select a jury consisting of as many "Continentals" as possible, because he believed that the "Continentals" would identify
with, and hence sympathize with, Weatherwax. Id.
The second objective ofJoseph's sympathy-based trial strategy was to persuade
the jury to convict Weatherwax on a lesser offense in the event that the jury did not
fully acquit him on the basis of the self-defense claim. Id. Considering that Joseph's trial strategy was sympathy-based, according to the Third Circuit, Joseph was
understandingly "ecstatic" when the empaneled jurors consisted of three "Continentals." Id. (noting it was largest number of "Continentals" thatJoseph had ever

seen on Virgin Islands jury).
96. Id. at 1432 & n.4. The Supreme Court has yet to assert that "ineffective
assistance of counsel occurs whenever an attorney exercises his or her professional

judgment based on the belief that such aversions and affinities may influence a
jury's verdict." Id.

Lawyers sometimes have empirical data to rely upon when selecting ajury, but
more often than not, lawyers make trial strategy judgments based primarily on
probabilities. Id. Frequently, the probabilities they utilize are only "based on an
assessment of human nature rooted in the lawyer's own personal experience." Id.
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Ample Consultation

The Third Circuit also recognized that Joseph responded affirmatively to the requests of Weatherwax and his family to "file a motion" or
"do something" in response to the "newspaper incident.

' 97

Accordingly,

the court determined that Joseph gave ample consideration to both
Weatherwax and his family's suggestions.98
The Weatherwax court cites several cases and articles indicating the correlation
between juror/defendant race and the effect it has on acquittals. Id. (citing Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 61 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[C]onscious
and unconscious prejudice persists in our society and . . .may influence some
juries."); id. at 68 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[C]onscious and unconscious racism can affect the way white jurors perceive minority defendants and the facts
presented at their trials, perhaps determining the verdict of guilt or innocence.");
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287 (1987) (discussing study indicating that
African-American defendants who kill Caucasian victims have greatest incidence of
receiving death penalty); seeJeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, EqualProtection and
Jury Selection: Denying that Race Still Matters, 1994 Wis. L. Rv. 511, 628 n.584 (noting studies show likelihood of acquittal by juror is correlated to race ofjuror and
of defendant); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MIcH L.
REv. 1611, 1616-43 (1985) (discussing research indicating determination of guilt
influenced byjurors' racial bias); NancyJ. King, PostconvictionReview ofJury Discrimination: Measuringthe Effects ofJuror Race on Jury Decisions,92 MICH. L. REv. 63, 80-99
(1993) (discussing studies that indicate race influences jury decisions)).
97. Id. at 1435. Specifically, the court stated that "Weatherwax had an ample
opportunity to convey the information available to him and to share his own appraisal of the situation." Id. at 1436.
98. Id. at 1437. For clarification purposes, it is important to note that neither
the family members nor Weatherwax complained that Joseph failed to give ample
consideration to their concerns. Id. at 1436. They complained only that Joseph
committed to "do something" and never did. Id. (noting family complained of
Joseph's failure to "file a motion").
According to the Third Circuit, not only did Joseph listen attentively to
Weatherwax and his family regarding their concerns about the possibility of jury
prejudice and possible courses of action in response to the incident, but the interchange between Weatherwax and Joseph in the courthouse on the morning of
the last day of the trial was an adequate attorney-client consultation. Id. Joseph's
consultation with Weatherwax on the last day of the trial "cannot fairly .. .be
described as a failure to consult." Id. In assessing the adequacy ofJoseph's consultation with Weatherwax, the court considered the fact that the newspaper incident
arose suddenly on the last day of the trial as the jury was getting ready to deliberate. Id. "(T]his interchange, while brief, was far from perfunctory." Id. In her
affidavit, Sallie Lay indicated that the interchange on the last morning of the trial
lasted long enough for several family members, including Weatherwax, to offer
suggestions as to how to deal with the newspaper incident. Id. For a further discussion of what Weatherwax and his family thought Joseph should do in response
to the newspaper incident, see supra note 69 and accompany text.
The Third Circuit discussed the purposes served by the requirement that an
attorney consult with his or her client concerning issues on which counsel has the
"final word." Id. In considering the purposes of attorney-client consultation, the
court concluded that there was no threat to the accomplishment of any of the
consultation objectives. Id. First, the consultation requirement assures that the
client has the opportunity to assist in his own defense. Id. Second, the requirement also assures that the attorney will consider the client's desires and views as to
the best course of defense. Id. Third, the court recognized that the consultation
requirement promotes and maintains the attorney-client relationship. Id. Finally,
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Additionally, the Third Circuit in Weatherwax determined thatJoseph
acted reasonably in not disclosing to Weatherwax his final decision not to
inform the court.9 9 In short, the Third Circuit found that there was not
an opportunity for meaningful consultation with Weatherwax afterJoseph
had made his decision not to pursue the newspaper incident. 10 0 The
court also noted that even if there was a fair opportunity for Joseph to
further consult with Weatherwax, Joseph could not reasonably have been
expected to anticipate anything being accomplished by doing so. 101
Therefore, the court maintained that it is reasonable for an attorney not
if necessary, the consultation requirement affords the client the opportunity to
seek other representation if he or she is unhappy with the course of legal representation with the current attorney. Id. at 1436-37.
The court recognized that "[w]hile an attorney's education and experience
give him superior knowledge of generalized technical information, 'It]he client
possesses superior knowledge of another sort-knowledge of the facts and circumstances of his case."' Id. (quoting Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 1146 n.33 (11th
Cir. 1991)); see also Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and ClientDecisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 41,100 (1979); cf Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 691 (noting that counsel's decision not to investigate matter must be evaluated
in light of information that defendant might have supplied counsel).
The Third Circuit maintained that an attorney may not know his client's views
and desires if no consultation takes place. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1436-37. The
court concluded that, "nothing about the length or character of the conference
would appear to have strained the attorney-client relationship between Joseph and
Weatherwax." Id. Generally, if a client discovers through consultation with his
attorney that the attorney intends to pursue a strategy contrary to that desired by
the client, the client may deem it damaging enough to his defense to seek alternate representation. Id. at 1437.
99. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1437. Joseph assured Weatherwax and Weatherwax's family members that he would "file a motion," but allegedly failed to communicate to Weatherwax that he chose not to file a motion. Id. at 1436-37. The
district court found that Joseph deliberately misled Weatherwax when he said he
would "do something." Id. at 1437 n.6. The Third Circuit further noted:
WhetherJoseph made his final decision before or after the conclusion of
the conference, the district court was not at liberty to overturn Weatherwax's conviction without making a finding, based on record evidence,
that without Joseph's assurances about filing a motion, an objection
would have been raised and the course of events altered.
Id.
100. Id. at 1437. Weatherwax did not contend that he would have sought
different counsel had he known of Joseph's final decision. Id.
101. Id. Even assuming Weatherwax would have wanted to change representation of counsel if he had been informed of Joseph's decision, the district court
did not find that Weatherwax actually would have sought to change representation, nor did the district court find that the trial court would have permitted a
continuance and change of representation on the last day of trial. Id. Injustifying
Joseph's decision and his subsequent failure to inform Weatherwax of his decision,
the Third Circuit held that, in light of the surrounding circumstances, Joseph did
not reasonably believe that Weatherwax would seriously consider a change in representation, nor did he believe that the court would have permitted a change in
representation on the last day of trial. Id. Not only would a continuance have
burdened the jury, but new counsel may have pursued the same strategy asJoseph.
Id. at 1437-38.
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to communicate his or her final decision to the client when they have
10 2
previously exchanged views on the issue.
3.

The Officer Fulfills His Duty

In Weatherwax, the Third Circuit next addressed whether Joseph's decision not to bring the newspaper incident to the court's attention was a
breach of his duty as an officer of the court.10 3 The court reiterated its
previous explanation and determined that 'Joseph acted as he did solely
for the purpose of serving what he believed to be the best interests of his
client and in a manner consistent with his other obligations to his
104
client."
Moreover, the Weatherwax court noted that even if Joseph did have a
duty as an officer of the court to inform the trial court of the newspaper
incident, the alleged breach of that duty did not require a reversal of
Weatherwax's conviction for two reasons.10 5 First, even if Joseph
breached his duty to the court, he still could have rendered Weatherwax
effective assistance. 10 6 Second, the court emphasized the perverse ramifi102. Id. at 1438. The court rationalized this finding by likening the situation
to one when decisions must be made in the heat of battle at a trial, when it is often
"unreasonable to expect any consultation before the decision is made and implemented." Id. at 1437. Moreover, "[t]he constitutional duty to consult regarding
issues on which counsel has the last word requires only that counsel act reasonably
in light of the circumstances and what is likely to be accomplished by a consultation." Id.
103. Id. at 1438. The Third Circuit ultimately held that any breach of a duty
to the court committed byJoseph would not justify overturning Weatherwax's conviction. Id.
The lower court reasoned that the trial judge's warnings to the jury that they
should avoid reading articles about the trial and Joseph's duty, as a criminal defense attorney, to assure that the trial would be a reliable adversarial testing process, incited Joseph's duty to report to the trial court. Id. (stating that counsel has
"'duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable
adversarial testing process"' (quoting Strickland 466 U.S. at 688 (1984))).
The Third Circuit, however, did not express a view on either of the reasons
advanced by the district court. Id. Notably, when the Weatherwax family notified
Joseph of the newspaper incident, they did not report a violation of the judge's
order that jurors avoid reading articles about the trial. Id. at 1438 n.7. Thus, the
court stated, that 'Joseph's view that there likely had been no violation of that
order was not unreasonable.... The issue of whether Joseph had an ethical duty
to the court to report the newspaper incident is, accordingly, a debatable one." Id.
104. Id. at 1438. IfJoseph had requested that an investigation be made into
the possibility ofjury misconduct, court approval would have been required. Id. at
1438 n.7. In Joseph's professional judgment, seeking court approval was inconsistent with his duty of loyalty to the client. Id.; see also MODEL RULES, supra note 36,
at Rule 1.6 (discussing attorney's duties to client).
105. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1438.
106. Id. The court stated: "Assuming that Joseph did violate some ethical
duty to the court that would warrant disciplinary sanctions against him, that breach
would provide no justification for a remedy that would, in effect, impose a sanction
upon the government." Id. (emphasis omitted). The "remedy" alluded to would
be to reverse Weatherwax's murder conviction on the basis of an alleged breach of
Joseph's duty to the court. Id. The court implied that when the "remedy" is bal-
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cation of overturning Weatherwax's conviction on the basis of Joseph's
alleged breach of his duty to the court-future defense counsel would
have an incentive to breach their duty as an officer of the court by committing this kind of reversible error, thereby giving the defendant an escape
10 7
from a conviction.
4.

The Dissent: The Ax that Grinds

Judge Lewis's dissent in Weatherwax focused on Joseph's decision not
to bring the newspaper incident to the attention of the trial court.10 8 According to Judge Lewis, Joseph's decision should not have been so
strongly inspired by the race of the jury. 10 9 Specifically, Judge Lewis maintained thatJoseph's decision was unreasonable in light of "prevailing professional norms," and moreover, that it was based on an underlying
assumption explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in Batson.110 Furanced against the justice achieved by incarcerating a murderer, the effects of the
possibility of the breach of an ethical duty pale in comparison. Id.
107. Id. Moreover, an alleged breach of a duty to the court by defense counsel does not alone justify overturning turning the defendant's murder conviction.
Id.

108. Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting). Judge Lewis stated that "[a] naive assumption
about race served as the sole basis for Joseph's 'strategic decision' to ignore the

wishes of his client regarding the newspaper incident." Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting).
For a further discussion of the considerations taken into account by an attorney
when selecting a jury, see supra note 62.
109. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1439 (Lewis, J., dissenting). Judge Lewis opined
that the majority failed to adequately pursue the extent to which the "racially
charged" nature of the case influenced Joseph's decision. Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting). In Judge Lewis's opinion, the reasonableness of Joseph's strategic decision
needed to be assessed in light of the assumptions that influenced his decision. Id.

(Lewis, J., dissenting).
Judge Lewis disagreed with the majority's holding that Joseph's decision
stemmed from a belief that the jury was the "best that [Joseph] could hope for,"

and thus, was a strategic decision made in accordance with "prevailing professional
norms." Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting). The majority emphasized Joseph's alleged reasonable belief that the jury of three Caucasians was the best that Weatherwax, a
Caucasian defendant, could hope for. Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting). In making this
decision, the majority concluded that Joseph's decision was "reasonable 'under
prevailing professional norms."' Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion at 1432). Furthermore, the majority concluded thatJoseph's decision was one
that any other competent litigator in his situation would have made. Id. (Lewis,J.,
dissenting).
110. Id. at 1438 (Lewis, J., dissenting); see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97
(1986) (prohibiting race dependent use of peremptory challenges).
Judge Lewis noted that the Weatherwax case did not intend for the court to
consider the reasonableness of trial strategies that are designed to appeal to the
racial composition of thejury. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d 1438 n.8 (Lewis,J., dissenting).
Instead, Judge Lewis indicated that he would consider the issue of racial jury composition only to the extent necessary to adequately discuss:
[T] he issue of whether a strategic decision, grounded exclusively upon a

lawyer's assumptions about the proclivities of jurors based solely on their
race, can be considered professionally reasonable when the decision runs
counter to the express wishes of his or her client and increases the likeli-
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thermore, Judge Lewis argued that it was illogical for the majority to conclude that Weatherwax would have benefited from the presence of the
prejudiced juror simply because that juror was Caucasian.'1 1
Judge Lewis's dissent emphasized that all decisions made at any time
during a trial could be considered strategic. 1 12 Thus, simply labeling a
decision "strategic" would not necessarily mean that the decision falls
within the "'wide range of ... competent assistance."' 11 3 Furthermore,
Judge Lewis contended that the majority's conclusion that Joseph's inaction was "reasonable 'under prevailing professional"' norms was a "leap,"
because the majority did not fully confront the issue of why Joseph felt the
jury was favorable for Weatherwax 1 14 According to Judge Lewis, Joseph
hood that [the] client's constitutional right to an impartial jury will be
violated.
Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting).
111. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1439 (Lewis, J., dissenting). Concedingly, it
makes little sense to argue that Weatherwax would have benefited from a possibly
prejudiced juror simply because the juror was Caucasian. Id. (Lewis, J.,
dissenting).
112. Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting) (arguing most, if not all, decisions by counsel
before, during and after trial may be considered strategic).
113. Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 694 (1984)). In other words, "not all strategic decisions are by definition
professionally reasonable." Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting). Judge Lewis noted that in
the first review of the case in 1994, the court observed that:
"[T] rial counsel's actions ... would indicate that representation was deficient unless the district court determines he [Joseph] decided to forego
voir dire because he thought the jury was favorable to his client." . . . I
adhere to this statement insofar as it is premised upon the notion that
strategic decisions by counsel, including those based upon a lawyer's belief that ajury is favorable to his client, are presumptively reasonable. In
this case, however, the record developed on remand clearly demonstrates
thatJoseph's reliance upon the favorable make-up of the jury as an explanation for his inaction was unreasonable because it was motivated solely
by an illegitimate race-based stereotype.
Id. at 1439 n.10 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 1439 (Lewis, J., dissenting). Judge Lewis opined that Joseph's assumptions regarding racial partisanship of Caucasian jurors were unfortunate and
unreasonable. Id. at 1441 (Lewis, J., dissenting). Moreover, such assumptions
should never "form the basis of a professionally reasonable strategic decision in
light of the interests that weighed in favor of bringing the matter to the court's
attention." Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting).
Judge Lewis questioned the majority's holding that Joseph reasonably feared
the consequences of bringing the newspaper incident to trial court's attention. Id.
at 1439 n.9 (Lewis, J., dissenting). A mistrial or the dismissal of a juror would have
required a finding by the trial court that the newspaper article was: (1) read by one
or more jurors; (2) that the contents of the newspaper negatively prejudiced
Weatherwax; and (3) that ajuror who read the article was actually influenced by its
prejudicial nature. Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting); see Government of the Virgin Islands
v. Weatherwax, 20 F.3d 572, 578 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing Government of the
Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 814 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987), affd sub nom. Dowling v.
United States, 493 U.S. 372 (1990)), rev'd, 77 F.3d 1425, 1436 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 538 (1996)). There were no findings of these effects by either the district court or by the Third Circuit majority. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1439 n.9 (Lewis,

J., dissenting).
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To illustrate the point that the majority's logic in deeming Joseph's decision
to be "strategic" was unfounded, Judge Lewis utilized a hypothetical in which the
hypothetical attorney made a decision not to call a witness on the basis of his race.
Id. at 1439-40 (Lewis, J., dissenting). Judge Lewis's hypothetical considered a defendant in a similar situation as Weatherwax, under a slightly different courtroom
scenario. Id. at 1439 (Lewis, J., dissenting). The hypothetical defendant, John
Doe, an African-American male, shot a Caucasian man, claimed that the killing was
in self-defense and was tried in front of an all white jury. Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting).
Doe requested that an eyewitness of the crime, an African-American male, be
called to testify, but Doe's attorney failed to comply with the request. Id. at 1440
(Lewis, J., dissenting). Doe appealed, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel
and alleging that "his lawyer was incompetent based upon his decision not to introduce the eyewitness testimony of the black man, whom Doe felt.., could have
aided in his defense." Id. (Lewis,J., dissenting). Doe's attorney claimed that he, in
effect, exercised his authority to make a strategic decision; "that he chose not to
call this individual[, the African-American eyewitness,] as a witness because he
made a professional judgment and concluded that the witness's testimony would
have had no impact upon the jury." Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting). Lewis's dissent
pointed out that the Weathenvax record indicated that for Joseph's decision not to
bring the newspaper incident to the trial court's attention was similar to the logic
of Doe's attorney in deciding not to call an African-American eyewitness. Id.

(Lewis, J., dissenting).
Supposing that the hypothetical attorney failed to call the witness because he
felt that the testimony of an African-American man on behalf of an African-American defendant "would carry no weight in the minds of an all-white jury," Judge
Lewis concluded, "[s] urely the majority would not conclude" that an attorney "employed a reasonable strategy by allowing.., outmoded racial stereotyping to influence whether or not to call a witness." Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting). Judge Lewis also
stated that, "[u]nder the majority's logic, the lawyer's explanation that the witness
was not called because the testimony would have been ineffectual would, standing
alone, constitute a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that Doe's counsel acted "reasonably 'under prevailing professional norms."' Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting)
(quoting majority opinion at 1433, which favorably cites United States v. Long, 674
F.2d 848, 855 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding counsel's failure to call alibi witness did
not constitute ineffective assistance and that "court will not second guess tactical
decisions of counsel in deciding whether to call certain witnesses")); see United
States v. Boyles, 57 F.3d 535, 551 (7th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that court will not
second-guess trial tactic decisions that are reasonably based); Tomlin v. Myers, 30
F.3d 1235, 1244 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that "[w]hile we may disagree with counsel's tactics, such tactics do not fall outside the wide ambit of reasonable representation merely because their wisdom is subject to second-guessing"); Griffin v.
Wainwright, 760 F.2d 1505, 1514 (l1th Cir. 1985) (stating that tactical decision
"will almost never be overturned on habeas corpus"), vacated, 476 U.S. 1112
(1986); Perron v. Perrin, 742 F.2d 669, 673 (1st Cir. 1984) (emphasizing that judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential and court shall
not second-guess tactical decisions made by counsel); United States ex rel. Huckstead v. Greer, 737 F.2d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that "we are not free to
second guess legitimate tactical decisions, rather, we examine only those blunders
not classifiable as attorneys' tactics and determine whether they amount to grossly
unprofessional conduct"); United States v. Bad Cob, 560 F.2d 877, 881 (8th Cir.
1977) (holding that attorney's professional judgment regarding tactical decisions
should not be second-guessed by hindsight); United States v. Moore, 529 F.2d 355,
357 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (abjuring second-guessing strategic and tactical decisions
made by counsel, but holding that inadequate preparation by counsel constitutes
ineffective assistance); United States v. Hager, 505 F.2d 737, 739 (8th Cir. 1974)
(stating that "the exercise of a defense attorney's professional judgment should
not be second-guessed by hindsight").
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undoubtedly disregarded Weatherwax's request that he "do something"
about the newspaper incident because he felt that the Caucasian jurors
would sympathize with his Caucasian client.' 15 Furthermore, Judge Lewis
implied that Joseph's assumptions regarding racial relationships between
Caucasian jurors and Caucasian defendants were so deep-seated that Jo116
sephjeopardized Weatherwax's constitutional right to an impartial jury.
As such, Judge Lewis concluded that the "only professionally responsible
and reasonable choice for Joseph was to inform the trial court of what had
occurred." i 7 Consequently, Judge Lewis maintained that making decisions on the basis of race should not be considered "strategic decisionmaking"; rather race should not be regarded as a crucial factor in decisionmaking and it is wholly adverse to the Supreme Court's holding in
Batson." 8
B.

CriticalAnalysis

In concluding that Joseph rendered effective assistance to Weatherwax, the Third Circuit not only disregarded the Batson decision and misapplied the discretion requirement formulated in Strickland, it also
115. Weatheroax, 77 F.3d at 1441 (Lewis,J., dissenting). Joseph's decision was
entirely motivated by race. Id. Joseph stated that "Continentals," or Caucasians,
are "retirees who are viewed as conservative and anti-crime." Id.; see also Brief for
Appellant at 8 n.4, Government of the Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d 1425
(3d Cir. 1996) (No. 95-7126). In effect, this statement reveals that Joseph concluded that the three Caucasian jurors would favor Weatherwax for no reason
other than their shared race. Weathenax, 77 F.3d at 1441 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
Dismayed byJoseph's decision and it's justification,Judge Lewis rhetorically asked:
"Why else would persons who are 'conservative and anti-crime' identify with an
individual charged with first degree murder and illegal possession of a firearm?"

Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting).
116. Weathenoax, 77 F.3d at 1441 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (Lewis,J., dissenting). From Judge Lewis's vantage point, the majority sufficiently considered Weatherwax's request thatJoseph "do something" about
the newspaper incident and the possibility that a failure to inform the court of the
incident could jeopardize Weatherwax's constitutional right to an impartial jury.
Id. (Lewis,J., dissenting). Thus, in light of these two considerations,Joseph should
have called the court's attention to the newspaper incident. Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting). Instead, the majority identified with Joseph despite the Supreme Court's
holding in Batson and concluded that Joseph acted professionally and within his
authority by not informing the court of the possibility ofjury prejudice. Id. (Lewis,
J., dissenting); see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) ("A person's race
simply 'is unrelated to his fitness as a juror."' (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co.,
328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946)). According to Judge Lewis's dissent, Joseph's assumption that the Caucasian jurors would sympathize with Weatherwax because of their
shared race was undeserving of any weight given by the majority. Weatherwax, 77
F.3d at 1441 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
118. Weathervax, 77 F.3d at 1440 (Lewis, J., dissenting); see also Batson, 476

U.S. at 87 ("Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from
juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice."). In
light of the Batson holding, basing trial decisions on race is "an odious form of

racial reasoning disguised as a legitimate strategic judgment." Weatherwax, 77 F.3d
at 1440 (Lewis,J., dissenting).
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overlooked Joseph's violation of several professional standards, including:
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules); the ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code); and the ABA Standardsfor
CriminalJustice.1 19 The court's nonrecognition of Joseph's violations in
Weatherwax impermissibly denied Weatherwax his constitutional rights to
trial by an impartial jury and to effective assistance of defense counsel.
1. ExpandingStrickland and NarrowingBatson
The Weatherwax majority erroneously applied the discretionary Strickland standard in two ways: (1) by failing to give ample consideration to the
Model Rules and the Model Code and (2) by validatingJoseph's inaction as a
strategic decision, when in fact he made that decision on the basis of racial
partisanship.1 20 In doing so, the Third Circuit inadvertently misused the
an action that was explicitly rediscretionary Stricklandstandard to excuse
12 1
jected by the Supreme Court in Batson.
Holding that Joseph did in fact render effective legal assistance, the
Weatherwax majority hid behind the curtain of strategic decision-making to
excuse Joseph's dereliction of his duties.122 Furthermore, the Third Cir119. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 79 (rejecting reasonableness of assumption that
African-American jurors are more likely to sympathize and favor African-American
defendants solely on account of their shared race); Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984) (holding that court must exercise discretion when evaluating counsel's performance, but decision by counsel must be made according to
prevailing professional norms). For a complete discussion of the professional
rules and guidelines Joseph breached, see infra notes 131-56 and accompanying
text.
120. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1438 (Lewis, J., dissenting). For a discussion of
the professional rules and guidelines Joseph breached, see infra notes 131-56 and
accompanying text.
121. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668-96 (establishing standard for evaluating ineffectiveness of counsel claims); see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 666
(1984) (applying Strickland standard to evaluate defendant's claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel); Nagi v. United States, 90 F.3d 130, 135-37 (6th Cir. 1996)
(same), cert. denied, No. 96-7218, 1996 WL 745354 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1997); Boria v.
Keane, 90 F.3d 36, 37 (2d Cir. 1996) (same), petitionforcert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342
(U.S. Oct. 11, 1996) (No. 96-628); Chateloin v. Singletary, 89 F.3d 749, 752 (11th
Cir. 1996) (same); Mazzell v. Evatt, 88 F.3d 263, 266-69 (4th Cir. 1996) (same), cert.
denied sub nom. Mazzell v. Moore, 117 S. Ct. 527 (1996); Thompson v. Calderon, 86
F.3d 1509, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Carr, 80 F.3d 413, 41719 (10th Cir. 1996) (same); Enoch v. Gramley, 70 F.3d 1490, 1502 (7th Cir. 1995)
(same), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 95 (1996); Nichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255, 1284-85
(5th Cir. 1995) (same), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2559 (1996); Vance v. Lehman, 64
F.3d 119, 122-24 (3d Cir. 1995) (same), cert. denied sub nom. Vance v. Horn, 116 S.
Ct. 736 (1996); United States v. McGill, 11 F.3d 223, 226-28 (1st Cir. 1993) (same);
United States v. Williams, 994 F.2d 1287, 1290-91 (8th Cir. 1993) (same); Casale v.
Fair, 833 F.2d 386, 391-92 (1st Cir. 1987) (same).
For a discussion of the facts, holding, and precedential value of Strickland, see
supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
122. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1440 (Lewis, J., dissenting). Moreover, the Third
Circuit seemed to overlook a lawyer's obligation to "maximize the likelihood that
the client will prevail in litigation" by failing to secure an impartial jury. Roy D.
SIMON, JR. & MuRRAY L. SCHWARTZ, LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION: CASES
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cuit overlooked the Supreme Court's decision in Batson, which explicitly
rejected the notion that it is reasonable to assume African-American jurors
will be partial to African-American defendants, merely on account of their
shared race.1 23 Surely, the Supreme Court never intended to excuse racially-based decisions made by an attorney under the guise of strategic decision-making. Rather, the court reached an opposite conclusion in
Strickland, where it held that a court should exercise a great deal of discre124
tion when evaluating an attorney's performance.
Surprisingly, however, the Third Circuit validated Joseph's basis for
inaction despite the Batson holding, which squarely denounced of racial
partisanship as a valid basis for decision-making.' 25 Nonetheless, the
Third Circuit granted Joseph's "strategic" decision an immense amount of
discretion, despite the fact that he based his decision, one shrouded in
racial prejudice, on an explicitly rejected premise. 12 6 Moreover, while the
Strickland test forces an allegedly wronged defendant to meet a heavy burden in establishing that his or her counsel rendered ineffective assistance,
the burden is not so heavy as to pardon attorney decisions based on noth1 27
ing other than racial partisanship.
The Supreme Court has stated that "U]udicial scrutiny of counsel's
performance must be highly deferential" and emphasized that no hard
and fast rules exist by which a court considering an ineffectiveness of
218 (3d ed. 1994); see Lorraine J. Adler, New York's Loyalty to the
Spirit of Miranda: Simply the Best for Twenty-Five Years, 47 VAND. L. Rv. 889, 907
(1994) (discussing that requirement of Mirandawarnings secures client's right to
impartial jury); Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Preemptoiy Challenges and the Roles
of the Jury, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1041 (1995) (stating that jury is protector of parties'
Sixth Amendment rights); Scott M. Matheson, Jr., The Prosecutor, The Press, and Free
Speech, 58 FoRDnAM L. REv. 865, 886 (1990) (stating that prosecutor can be sued
for violation of accused's constitutional fair trial right as result of prejudicial extrajudicial comment); Frederick T. Kelsey, Comment, Gender Based Preemptory Challenges and the New York State Constitution,8 TOuRO L. REv. 91, 105-06 (1991) (stating
that peremptory challenges are essential means to secure impartial jury).
In addition, an integral part of legal professionalism is for an attorney to submerge personal desires in favor of the client's, particularly when the attorney's
desire is based on a groundless premise, such as racial partisanship. Weatherwax, 77
AND MATERIALs

F.3d at 1441 (Lewis, J., dissenting);

SIMON

& SCHWARTZ, supra, at 219.

123. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1438 (Lewis,JT, dissenting) (citing Batson, 476 U.S.
at 79). For a discussion of the facts and holding of Batson, see supra notes 47-51
and accompanying text.
124. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 79-80 (discussing
premise that strategic decisions should not involve consideration of person's race).
125. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1438 (Lewis,J., dissenting) (citing Batson, 476 U.S.
at 79).
126. Id. at 1441 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
127. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. The Strickland Court recognized that the
lower courts require the defendant to meet a heavier burden in establishing that
counsel's substandard assistance prejudiced the outcome. Id. Specifically, some of
the lower courts require a strict outcome-determinative test. Id. at 696-97. For a
further discussion of the test established in Strickland, see supra notes 38-46 and

accompanying text.
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counsel claim can evaluate an attorney's performance.' 2 8 Pursuant to this
premise, the Third Circuit relied heavily on the Supreme Court's holding
that it is not within a federal court's jurisdiction to "establish rules of ethical conduct for lawyers practicing in the state courts" and also noted the
Supreme Court's emphasis on the refusal to dictate how to behave in
129
court "unless and until federal rights are violated."'
128. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89. The Supreme Court stated that an attorney's "basic duties neither exhaustively define the obligations of counsel nor form
a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance." Id. at 688. The Court
noted that a set of hard and fast rules would "interfere with the constitutionally
protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must
have in making tactical decisions." Id. at 689 (citing United States v. Decoster, 624
F.2d 196, 208 (D.C Cir. 1979) (refusing to establish rules appropriating discrete
standards for proper attorney conduct)); see Mazzell v. Evatt, 88 F.3d 263, 269 (4th
Cir. 1996) (following Decoster's refusal to adopt hard and fast rules and to remove
counsel's decision-making independence); Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1431 (same);
Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1271 (5th Cir. 1995) (same), cert.
denied sub nom. Beets
v.Johnson, 116 S.Ct. 1547 (1996); Sims v. Livesay, 970 F.2d 1575, 1579 (6th Cir.
1992) (same); Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453, 1463 (9th Cir. 1986) (same);
Sullivan v. Fairman, 819 F.2d 1382, 1390 (7th Cir. 1987) (same); United States ex
rel. Smith v. Lane, 794 F.2d 287, 290-94 (7th Cir. 1986) (same).
129. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 176-77 (1986) (Brennan,J., concurring).
Nix held that the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant to assistance of
counsel is not violated when an attorney refuses to cooperate with the defendant
in presenting perjured testimony. Id. at 171. Chief Justice Burger stated:
[The United States Supreme Court] must be careful not to narrow the
wide range of conduct acceptable under the Sixth Amendment so restrictively as to constitutionalize particular standards of professional conduct
and thereby intrude into the state's proper authority to define and apply
the standards of professional conduct applicable to those it admits to
practice in its courts.
Id. at 165. "[T]he Court cannot tell the States or the lawyers in the States how to
behave in their courts." Id. at 177 (Brennan,J., concurring). Furthermore, "[i]t is
for the States to decide how attorneys should conduct themselves in state criminal
proceedings, and this Court's responsibility extends only to ensuring that the restrictions a State enacts do not infringe a defendant's federal constitutional rights."
Id. at 189-90 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Mallard v. United States District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989) (discussing attorney's
obligation to represent indigent client); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin,
District 1, 486 U.S. 429 (1988) (discussing ethical duty of attorney to raise issues on
appeal which attorney felt lacked merit); Evans v. Jeff, 475 U.S. 717 (1986) (discussing ethical duty of attorney with regard to seeking legal fees); Polk County v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 323 (1981) (stating public defender has no obligation to
client to raise frivolous claims); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (discussing
ethical obligation of attorney where conflict of interest exists); In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litigation, 748 F.2d 157, 160 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that one inherent power of federal court is admission and discipline of attorneys practicing
before it).
As a result of the Supreme Court's reluctance to get involved in ethical obligations and practices in the state courts, there are few federal decisions addressing
the ethical duties of an attorney. See In re Meeker, 414 P.2d 862, 864 (N.M. 1966)
("The canons of professional ethics must be enforced by the Courts and must be
respected by members of the Bar if we are to maintain public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the administration of justice.").
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This having been said, a court considering a Sixth Amendment claim
is not left without guides to determine what is reasonable. Rather, prevailing norms of practice reflected in American Bar Association standards
provide the necessary guidance as to what is reasonable. 13 0 Thus, the
Third Circuit in Weatherwax was well within its jurisdiction to consider the
professional standards by which Joseph should have conducted himself as
Weatherwax's Sixth Amendment rights were endangered as a result of Joseph's inaction.
2.

Violation of Binding ProfessionalRules and the Risk of FundamentalRights

In holding in favor ofJoseph, the Third Circuit disregarded the premise advanced in Batson and misemployed the discretionary requirements
laid out in Strickland. Moreover, the court also overlooked Joseph's blatant
violation of several professional standards, including the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility and
13 1
the ABA Standardsfor CriminalJustice.
The Third Circuit's failure to conPursuant to the federal courts' constitutionally granted authority, the courts
deal with the cases presented in the state courts when constitutional issues are
violated. Accordingly, the vast majority of cases regarding attorney breaches of
ethical duties are from the state courts. See generally In reMalone, 480 N.Y.S.2d 603
(App. Div. 1984) (holding that action of attorney instructing corrections officer to
testify falsely under oath in order to protect officer from breaking "code of silence"
among corrections officers warranted censure); In re Connelly, 240 N.Y.S.2d 126
(App. Div. 1963) (holding that publication of laudatory article on practice of city
law firm in national magazine with acquiescence and aid of firm members violated
Canon of Professional Ethics regarding advertising); Maritrans G.P., Inc. v. Pepper,
Hamilton and Scheetz, 602 A.2d 241 (Pa. 1992) (maintaining that attorney's representation of subsequent client whose interests were materially adverse to former
client in substantially related matters was impermissible conflict of interest); American Dredging Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 389 A.2d 568 (Pa. 1978) (disqualifying
attorney and law firm from representing general contractor in action against subcontractor when firm and attorney previously represented subcontractor); In re
Bennett, 527 N.W.2d 691 (Wis. 1995) (holding that failure to communicate with
client and failure to take appropriate steps to protect client's interests warranted
revocation of license to practice law); In re Ermert, 513 N.W.2d 608 (Wis. 1994)
(establishing that attorney's failure to file action for client and misrepresentation
to client that action would be filed warranted 60-day suspension of license to practice law); In re Kinast, 508 N.W.2d 380 (Wis. 1993) (determining that failure to
abide by client's decision concerning objectives of representation warranted suspension of license for 60 days); In re Schwartz, 496 N.W.2d 605 (Wis. 1993) (holding that attorney's failure to keep clients advised of significant developments in
personal injury action and acting contrary to client's explicit direction to seek setdement warranted 60-day suspension from practice of law); In re Lehmann, 494
N.W.2d 432 (Wis. 1993) (finding that one attorney's failure to inform client about
status of legal matter and to communicate with client warranted 60-day license
suspension).
130. Strickland 466 U.S. at 688. The Court indicated that the ABA Standards

for CriminalJustice serves as a guide to determine what is reasonable. Id. (referring
to CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 34, at Standard 4-1.1 to 4-8.6).
131. Id. at 690-91 (holding that court must exercise discretion when evaluating counsel's performance, but decision by counsel must be made according to
prevailing professional norms); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (re-
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sider these standards was in error as each rule violated by Joseph subsequently jeopardized Weatherwax's Sixth Amendment rights to effective
assistance of counsel and to trial by an impartial tribunal.' 3 2 In other
words, the relationship between professional standards and constitutional
rights is a circular one-the evaluation of counsel's performance in light
of the professional rules is necessary when a constitutional right may be
violated. Likewise, when a constitutional right is violated, it is necessary to
evaluate counsel's performance in light of professional standards. Therefore, in failing to consider Joseph's violation of several binding professional rules, the Third Circuit failed to properly consider Joseph's Sixth
33
Amendment violations.'

Rule 1.1 of the Model Rules provides that "[a] lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client," which "requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation."' 3 4 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit overlooked Joseph's
failure to render "competent representation" when he failed to notify the
trial court of the possibility of jury prejudice.135 Clearly, "competent representation" encompasses notifying a trial court of such an occurrence,
13 6
thereby preserving a client's constitutional right to a fair trial.
jecting stereotypical notion that Mrican-American jurors are more likely to sympathize with Mrican-American defendants solely on account of their shared race).
For a complete discussion of the professional rules and guidelines Joseph
breached, see infra notes 132-56 and accompanying text.
132. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89. The Supreme Court stated that counsel's
performance must be reasonable considering all the circumstances. Id. at 688.

The circumstances that the Third Circuit recognized, however, did not include the
jeopardized constitutional rights of Weatherwax. In light of the prevailing circumstance of risking his client's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, Joseph's
behavior and inaction clearly were opposite prevailing professional norms.
133. MODEL RuLEs, supranote 36, at Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3., 1.4(a)-(b), 2.1, 8.4(d)
(discussing lawyer's responsibilities toward clients); MODEL CODE, supranote 52, at
Canons 5, 6, 7 (outlining lawyer's duty to exercise independent professional judgment, competently represent client and zealously represent client); CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 34, at Standards 4-1.1, 4-5.2(b) (providing standard of
representation to which lawyers should adhere).
It should be noted that this author has recognized that for the most part,
circuit courts do not hear cases regarding breach of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. In fact, such matters are generally reserved to the state courts.
Nonetheless, because the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct are observed
across the nation, there is no reason that a federal court should not observe the
rules in the same manner as would a state court. For a discussion of the Model
Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, and 8.4(d), see infra notes 135-53 and accompanying text.
134. MODEL RuLEs, supranote 36, at Rule 1.1. Rule 1.1 states in full that "[a]

lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation." Id.

135. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d 1425, 1437 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 538 (1996). For a discussion of an attorney's duty to
render competent representation, see supra note 134 and infra note 136.
136. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1437. "Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill

consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill
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The Third Circuit also failed to considerJoseph's violation of Rule 1.3
of the Model Rules, which requires a lawyer to act with "reasonable diligence" in representing a client.1 3 7 In applying this rule a court must conthat necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge." Id. at Rule 1.1
cmt. Moreover, the Weatherwax court failed to recognize that if Joseph had exercised "legal knowledge," he would have considered the Supreme Court's decision
in Batson, rather than base his decision on a groundless presumption that the jury,
even if prejudiced by extraneous information, would have favored his client. Id. at
Rule 1.1. Factors used to determine whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter include the complexity and specialized nature
of the subject matter, the lawyer's general experience and training in the field in
question, the preparation and study the lawyer can give the matter, and whether it
is feasible and appropriate to consult with a lawyer of particular competence in the
field in question. Id. at Rule 1.1 cmt.
Joseph should have seriously considered the risk posed to his client's fate by a
tainted jury. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1428. Moreover, he should have considered
the Batson holding and have had the forethought to realize that the basis for his
decision-making would be called into question following the outcome of the murder trial. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 79 ("Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of
our system of justice.").
Joseph was, and currently is a well-known criminal lawyer in the Virgin Islands,
having been involved in numerous criminal trials prior to Weathenwax. Weatherwax,
77 F.3d at 1427. He did not indicate, however, that he had ever been presented
with the untimely possibility of a taintedjury. Thus, he should have consulted with
other, more experienced attorneys who may have dealt with the issue. For example, he could have consulted with the attorney involved in the Dowling case who
worked on the issue of jury prejudice. See Government of the Virgin Islands v.
Dowling, 814 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987) (granting new trial as result of insufficient
measures taken to determine jury prejudice).
Further, although the ABA Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility is not binding on lawyers and is simply a guide for proper behavior, the fact that Canon 6
mirrors Rule 1.1 of the ABA Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct is significant and, in
effect, Joseph was bound by the principle expressed in Canon 6. MODEL CODE,
supra note 52, at Canon 6, EC 6-1 ("[A] lawyer should act with competence and
proper care in representing clients."); see also MODEL RULES, supra note 36, at Rule
1.1 ("A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.").
The preliminary statement of the ABA Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility
indicates that it is designed to be adopted as an inspirational guide "and as a basis
for disciplinary action when the conduct of a lawyer falls below the required minimum standards stated in the Disciplinary Rules." MODEL CODE, supra note 52, at
Preliminary Statement. The preamble to the ABA Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility states:
Each lawyer must find within his own conscience the touchstone against
which to test the extent to which his actions should rise above minimum
standards.... [I]t is the desire for the respect and confidence of the
members of his profession and of the society which he serves that should
provide to a lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical
conduct.
Id. at pmbl. Thus, by breaching Rule 1.1 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct,Joseph breached Canon 6 of the ABA Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility---yet another violation that the Third Circuit overlooked.
137. MODEL RULES, supra note 36, at Rule 1.3. Rule 1.3 states that "[a] lawyer
shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." Id.;
see Caranto v. Brown, No. 93-1083, 1994 WL 737711, at *3 (Vet. App. Dec. 6, 1994)
(unpublished disposition) (determining that appellant's counsel failed to timely

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss1/6

44

Cirilla: A Caribbean Fantasy - The Case of the Juror Who Misbehaved and th

1997]

NOTE

sider the zeal with which an attorney represents a client; nevertheless, the
Weatherwax record neither criticizes nor praises the zeal with which Joseph
represented Weatherwax. 138 Nonetheless, Joseph failed to represent
Weatherwax with the zeal which other courts have required. 139 In particular, Joseph failed to secure Weatherwax's Sixth Amendment right to be
tried by an impartial jury, which is a clear indication of his failure to act
with reasonable diligence, and thus a clear violation of Rule 1.3.140
file reply brief); United States v. Boyce, 849 F.2d 833, 838 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding
that defense counsel made serious commitment to represent best interests of client
under Rule 1.3 but failed to file motion in favor of client); United States v.
LaRouche Campaign, 682 F. Supp. 610 (D. Mass. 1987) (holding that counsel had
good cause for filing motion to dismiss based on governmental misconduct with

respect to events occurring after deadlines for filing of motions); Applegate v.
Dobrovir, Oakes and Gebhardt, 628 F. Supp. 378, 388-89 (D.D.C. 1985) (holding
that firm competently represented client under Rule 1.3); United States v. Kropf,
39 MJ. 107, 108 (C.M.A. 1994) (referring to comment to Rule 1.3 and holding

that counsel is required to zealously represent client and to offer vigorous arguments in favor of client).
138. See Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1425 (applying no consideration to the lack of
zeal Joseph exhibited in representing Weatherwax).
139. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (stating that
"ffrom counsel's function as assistant to the defendant derive the overarching
duty to advocate the defendant's cause"); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 65-68
(1932) (discussing attorney's obligation to zealously represent his or her client);
see also Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REv. 39, 40 n.3
(1989) (considering duty of lawyer to zealously represent his or her client);
Michelle S. Jacobs, Legal Professionalism: Do Ethical Rules Require Zealous Representation ForPoor People?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 97 (1995) (same); Catherine J. Lanctot,
The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the FederalGovernment Lawyer: The Three
Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 951, 958 (1991) (same); Rona R. Mears, Ethics
and Due Diligence: A Lawyer's Perspective on Doing Business with Mexico, 22 ST. MARY'S
LJ. 605, 619-20 (1991) (same); E. Wayne Thode, The Ethical Standardfor the Advocate, 39 TEX. L. REv. 575 (1961) (same). A lawyer's obligation to zealously represent a client:
[I]n its fullest sense, is the heart of the adversary process. Each attorney,
as an advocate, acts for and seeks that which in his judgment is best for
his client, within the bounds authoritatively established. The advocate
does not decide what is just in this case-he would be usurping the function of the judge and jury-he acts for and seeks for his client that which
he is entitled to under the law. He can do no less and properly represent
[his] client.
Thode, supra, at 584.
140. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1433-38; see MODEL RULES, supra note 36, at Rule
1.3 ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing
a client.").
Correspondingly, Joseph also violated Canon 7 of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility which, in its ethical considerations, implicates Rule 1.3. The

Model Code states: "The advocate may urge any permissible construction of the law
favorable to his client, without regard to his professional opinion as to the likelihood that the construction will ultimately prevail." MODEL CODE, supranote 52, at

Canon 7, EC 7-4. Moreover, a lawyer, as an advocate, has no duty to forebear from
making every "proper argument in support of any legal point because he is not
convinced of its inherent soundness." ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and
Grievances, Formal Op. 280 (1949). A lawyer's "personal belief in the soundness

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997

45

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 6
320

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42: p. 275

In addition, when evaluating Joseph's performance the Third Circuit
failed to cite Joseph's violation of Rule 1.4(a) of the Model Rules which
obligates a lawyer to "keep a client reasonably informed about the status of
a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information."' 4 1 Yet, Joseph failed to communicate with Weatherwax regarding
his final decision. Despite the Third Circuit's rationale justifyingJoseph's
failure to properly inform Weatherwax, Joseph was not engaged in the
heat of battle at trial, and therefore, Weatherwax was not outside the
realm of easy communication. 142
Moreover, according to Rule 1.4(b) Joseph had a duty to explain to
Weatherwax his final decision not to inform the court of the newspaper
of his cause or of the authorities supporting it, is irrelevant" because the lawyer's
duty to zealously represent his client prevails. Id.
Incidentally, Canon 7 of the Model Code is also implicated in Rule 2.1 of the
ABA Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct. See MODEL RULES, supranote 36, at Rule 2.1

(stating attorney "shall exercise independent professional judgment"). In full,
Rule 2.1 states:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional
judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may
refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's
situation.
MODEL RULES, supra note 36, at Rule 2.1.
Similarly, the ethical consideration in Canon 7 states that a lawyer acting "as
an advisor furthers the interest of his client by giving his professional opinion as to
what he believes would likely be the ultimate decision of the courts on the matter
at hand and by informing his client of the practical effect of such decision."
MODEL CODE, supra note 52, at Canon 7, EC 7-5. The implication of Rule 2.1 and
EC 7-5 is that Joseph had an ethical duty to inform Weatherwax of his final decision, regardless of Weatherwax's anticipated response to the news. Joseph, as an
advisor and an advocate, had a duty to inform Weatherwax and to zealously represent Weatherwax, by securing the right to an impartial jury. MODEL RULES, supra
note 36, at Rule 1.4(a). For a discussion of the right to an impartial jury, see supra
notes 61-67.
141.

MODEL

RULES, supra note 36, at Rule 1.4(a); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at

688 (stating that out of counsel's function as assistant to defendant arises duty "to
consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important developments"); United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1465
(9th Cir. 1993) (Fletcher, J., concurring) (discussing necessity of open communication between attorney and client); Whitehouse v. United States District Court for
the District of Rhode Island, 53 F.3d 1349, 1360-61 (1st Cir. 1995) (same); Arcuri v.
Trump Taj Mahal Assoc., 154 F.R.D. 97 (D.N.J. 1994) (same); United States v.
AT&T, 86 F.R.D. 603, 613 (D.D.C. 1979) (same).
142. MODEL RULES, supra note 36, at Rule 1.4(a); see id. at Rule 1.4 cmt. 2

("The guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests,
and the client's overall requirements as to the character of representation."). Ap-

parently, Joseph should have fulfilled Weatherwax's reasonable expectations for

information regarding Joseph's final decision. Id. Joseph owed Weatherwax a
duty to inform him of the final decision because providing Weatherwax with such
information was in Weatherwax's best interest; that is, it was within Weatherwax's
best interest to procure an untainted jury in accordance with a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right. Id. Furthermore, Weatherwax certainly expected Joseph's
"character of representation" to sustain Weatherwax's constitutional rights. Id.
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incident so that Weatherwax could have made an "informed decision [ ]
regarding [his] representation."1 4 3 Similarly, the ABA Standardsfor CriminalJustice indicate that Joseph, as a defense attorney, had the ultimate authority to make strategic decisions after consultation with Weatherwax. t 44
As such, and because Joseph had ample opportunity to consult with
Weatherwax, Joseph violated these standards by failing to do so. It was
certainly "appropriate" to apprise Weatherwax of the final decision, as Joseph had a duty to keep Weatherwax informed of the "progress of prepar45
ing the defense."'
In Weatherwax, the Third Circuit held that it was "unreasonable to expect..., consultation before the decision is made and implemented...
because the opportunity for meaningful consultation" between Joseph and
Weatherwax did not exist; because they were in the "heat of battle," there
was nothing for Weatherwax to gain by consultation with Joseph. 146 On
the contrary, however, Joseph had ample time to consult with Weatherwax
and to inform him of the final decision. Furthermore, Joseph had a duty
to do so. The majority speculates that the trial court would not have
granted a continuance if it were informed of the incident per Weather-

143. Id. at Rule 1.4(b). The comment to Rule 1.4 attests that an attorney
should assure that his client has "sufficient information to participate intelligently
in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by
which they are to be pursued." Id. at Rule 1.4 cmt. It is quite clear that the application of the comments is directly applicable in Weathenvax. Because Joseph failed
to inform Weatherwax of his final decision not to notify the trial court about the
newspaper incident, Weatherwax was denied the information that would have allowed him to make an informed decision regarding the means employed in securing an impartial jury.
144. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 34, at Standard 4-5.2(b); see also
MODEL RULES, supra note 36, at Rule 1.2(a), (c) (stating counsel has authority to
make decisions concerning means of representation after ample consultation with
client). The ABA Standardsfor CriminalJustice state that "[s] trategic and tactical
decisions should be made by defense counsel after consultation with the client."
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 34, at Standard 4-5.2(b). In addition, a
lawyer is not obligated to take every action or step that the accused demands. Id. at
Standard 4-3.6 cmt.
145. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 34, at Standard 4-3.8(a) ("Defense counsel should keep the client informed of the developments in the case
and the progress of preparing the defense."); see also id. at 4-3.8(b) ("Defense
counsel should explain developments in the case to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.").
146. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d 1425, 1437 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 538 (1996). For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's consideration of Joseph's duty to inform Weatherwax of the final decision,
see supra notes 77-107.
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wax's insistence.14 7 But, is an effort to protect a constitutional right
148
grounds for stating that nothing would be gained by consultation?
Joseph's inaction was also a breach of the standard set forth in Rule
8.4(d) of the Model Rules, which states that it is professional misconduct for
a lawyer to "engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice." 149 CertainlyJoseph "engage[d] in conduct... prejudicial to the
administration ofjustice" by knowingly allowing a possibly prejudiced jury
to decide his client's fate. 150 Thus, Joseph risked an equitable administra147. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 814 F.2d 134, 135 (3d Cir.
1987) (holding that trial judge did not abuse discretion in declining to individually
question jurors, but "trial court committed reversible error in failing to conduct a
voir dire of the jury that would have permitted the court to evaluate the potential
prejudice to the defendant"); see also United States v. Barber, 80 F.3d 964, 968 (4th
Cir.) (discussing possibility that constitutional guarantee of fair trial required voir
dire into racial prejudice involved in case), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 198 (1996);
United States v. Desmarais, 531 F.2d 632, 633 (1st Cir. 1976) (stating that "the
latitude and manner of voir dire examination is within the sound discretion of the
...judge.., subject to the essential demands of fairness" (citing United States v.
Gassaway, 456 F.2d 624, 626 (5th Cir. 1972))); Wansley v. Slayton, 487 F.2d 90 (4th
Cir. 1973) (holding defendant is entitled to voir dire where reasonable likelihood

of prejudice is shown).
148. Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized that counsel is ultimately obligated to follow a client's decision, particularly where protection of a constitutional
right is at issue. SeeJones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 763 (1983) (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("The role of the defense lawyer should be above all to function as the instrument and defender of the client's autonomy and dignity in all phases of the
criminal process."). In his dissent, Justice Brennan indicated that the defense lawyer's role is to carry out the final instructions of the client, even if the defense
lawyer disagrees with the client's instructions. Id. at 764 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
According to Justice Brennan, the defense lawyer should advise the client about
how to maximize the chances of winning, but if the client disagrees with the lawyer's advice, the defense lawyer must follow the client's instructions. Id. (Brennan,

J., dissenting).
149. MODEL RULES, supra note 36, at Rule 8.4(d); see Erickson v. Newmar
Corp., 87 F.3d 298, 298 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that defense counsel's hiring of
plaintiff's metal expert to examine lock for another case without plaintiff's knowledge constituted misconduct prejudicial to administration of justice); In re Cordova-Gonzalez, 996 F.2d 1334 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding disbarment appropriate for
attorney who engaged in conduct prejudicial to administration of justice, by obtaining client's release on bail through pledge of property that was not pledgor's

to give); Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir. 1985)

(finding that defendant firm violated ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4(d)

when members rendered bad faith advice and wrote brief containing misleading
portrayals of fact).
Likewise, Canon 5 of the ABA Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility obligated

Joseph to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of Weatherwax

"within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit" of Weatherwax and "free of
compromising influences." MODEL CODE, supra note 52, at Canon 5, EC 5-1; see
also id. at EC 5-1 n.1 (citing Grievance Comm. v. Rattner, 203 A.2d 82, 84 (Conn.
1964) ("When a client engages the services of a lawyer.., he is entitled to feel that

•..he has the undivided loyalty of the one upon whom he looks as his advocate
and his champion.")).
150. MODEL RULES, supra note 36, at Rule 8.4(d). The comments do not indi-

cate that Rule 8.4(d) applies to the failure to secure an impartial jury in accord-
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tion of justice on Weatherwax's behalf by failing to secure an impartial
jury. Moreover, by basing his decision on racial partisanship, Joseph failed
to "exercise independent professional judgment," and instead, was a dupe
to the "compromising influence" of racial bias. Despite these compelling
factors, however, the Third Circuit impermissibly failed to address rule
8.4(d) as it related to Joseph's unethical conduct and Weatherwax's Sixth
Amendment rights.
Finally, the Third Circuit failed to address Joseph's breach of Rule 1.2
of the Model Rules, which governs the scope of an attorney's representation
of a client and permits the attorney to make strategic and tactical decisions
concerning the means of representation. 151 While a client is permitted to
make the decisions concerning the objectives of representation, an attorney is never permitted to make decisions concerning a client's constituance with a defendant's Sixth Amendment right, but it is clear that an attorney
who knowingly permits a tainted jury to decide his client's fate has prejudiced an
equitable administration of justice. See Levine v. United States District Court for
Central District of California, 764 F.2d 590, 602 (9th Cir. 1985) (Sneed, J., concurring) (discussing prosecutor's role in securing defendant's right to impartial jury);
United States v. McNeill, 728 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1984) (discussing defense counsel's
duty to raise possibility that prosecutorial misconduct risked defendant's right to
trial before impartial jury). See generally United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 927, 936
(6th Cir. 1984) (rejecting affirmative duty of assistant United States attorney to
disclose exculpatory evidence to grand jury which tends to negate guilt of
accused).
Interestingly, Florida's variation of Rule 8.4(d) states:
[A lawyer shall not] engage in conduct in connection with the practice of
law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to knowingly, or through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers
on any basis, including, but not limited to, on account of race, ethnicity,
gender, religion, national origin, disability, marital status, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status, employment, or physical characteristic.
FLORIDA RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-8.4 (1996).
Thus, it is reasonable to infer that a Florida court would find, pursuant to
Rule 4-8.4(d) of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, that Joseph's decision
based on racial partisanship was discriminatory and in violation of the rule. Id.; see
also Florida Bar v. Flowers, 672 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1996) (imposing 91-day suspension
on attorney for violation of Florida Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4-8.4(d) in
which attorney failed to provide requested immigration assistance to client).
151. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 36, at Rule 1.2(a). Rule 1.2(a) states that "[a]
lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation, subject to paragraph[ ] (c) . . . and shall consult with the client as to the
means by which they are to be pursued." Id. at Rule 1.2(a).
A client has the right to consult with his or her lawyer regarding the means to
be used in pursuing the objectives of representation. Id. at Rule 1.2 cmt. The
lawyer is not obligated to pursue certain objectives or employ certain means. Id.
"In questions of means, the lawyer should assume responsibility for.., legal tactical [decisions]." Id. Despite the above mentioned comments to Rule 1.2 of the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which simply guide an attorney's appropriate behavior, the rule, which is binding upon an attorney, states that "[a] lawyer
may limit the objectives of the representation if the client consents after consultation."
Id. at Rule 1.2(c) (emphasis added).
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tional rights. 15 2 Initially, it may appear that Joseph acted within the
authority provided by Rule 1.2, because the decision whether to call the
trial court's attention to the newspaper incident was, in fact, a strategic
decision concerning the means of representation. 15 3 Upon closer examination, however, the subject matter of the decision implicates a constitutional right. Not only was the premise for Joseph's final decision
groundless, as maintained in Batson, but his final decision jeopardized
Weatherwax's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by an impartial and
unbiased jury. 154 Thus, the allowance of extraneous influences upon jurors and the consideration by a jury of extra-record information violated
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial jury.155 Therefore, Jo-

152. Id. at Rule 1.2(a) ("The lawyer shall abide by the client's decision... as
to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will
testify."). Rule 1.2(a) preserves the client's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by
allowing full reign over decisions concerning his or her constitutional rights. See
Evans v. Jeff, 475 U.S. 717, 755-56 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The decision
whether to accept or reject the [settlement] offer is the plaintiffs alone, and the
lawyer must abide by the plaintiffs decision."); United States v. International Bd.
of Teamsters, 986 F.2d 15, 17 (2d Cir. 1993) (outlining that decision to settle case
rests with client alone); Benitez v. Collazo-Collazo, 888 F.2d 930, 933 (1st Cir.
1989) (explaining that attorney acted inappropriately in making appeal over objection of client). But see United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 754-55 (9th Cir.
1989) (holding that defense counsel did not violate Model Rule 1.2(a) because he
made strategic decision not to put defendant on stand even though defendant
wanted to testify), vacated, 928 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1991).
153. See MODEL RULES, supra note 36, at Rule 1.2 cmt. ("In questions of
means, the lawyer should assume responsibility for... legal tactical [decisions].").
Certain decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ultimately for the
accused to make, and others are ultimately for counsel to make. CRIMINALJUSTICE
STANDARDS, supra note 34, at Standard 4-5.2(a). The commentary to Standard 45.2(b) states that "the power of decision in matters of trial strategy and tactics rests
with the lawyer, after consultation with the client when consultation is, in the lawyer's judgment, both feasible and appropriate." Id. at Standard 4-5.2 cmt.
154. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) ("A person's race simply 'is
unrelated to his fitness as a juror."' (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S.
217, 227 (1946)). For further discussion of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, see supra notes 61-67.
155. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 150 (3d
Cir. 1975) (listing "consideration by the jury of extra-record facts about the case"
as incident of extraneous influence). The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right
to an impartialjury. Id. If the jury considers evidence not introduced by the court,
the jury's impartiality may be compromised. Id. at 150-51; see also Walthall, supra
note 61, at 1012 ("[E]xtraneousjury influences pose more of a threat to an individual's right to an impartial jury than do intra-jury influences."). Extra-record influences, including media and publicity, pose a threat to fairness; specifically extrarecord information, which "evades the safeguards of the judicial process."
Walthall, supra note 61, at 1011 n.28 (citing United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684, 695
(3d Cir. 1993) (unwilling to assume prejudice because of premature deliberations
in criminal case), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1205 (1994)); see also, United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d. 833, 840 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that extraneous and extra-record
information threaten occurrence of fair criminal proceeding (citation omitted)).
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seph's endangerment of Weatherwax's Sixth Amendment rights certainly
156
constituted grounds for incompetence.
V.

IMPACT

The majority opinion in Weathenvax simply failed to focus on the Sixth
Amendment rights at issue. 15 7 In essence, Weatherwax was denied two
constitutional guarantees; first, he was denied the right to be tried by an
impartial jury; and second, he was denied the right to effective assistance
of counsel.1 58 The Third Circuit justified its holding in this regard by impermissibly stretching Stfickland beyond its limits, thereby allowingJoseph
to escape his professional responsibility. It did so even though Joseph
based his strategic decision on a rejected premise, violated several professional rules and jeopardized his client's constitutional rights in the
process. 159

The broad holding of Weatherwax is a significant threat to the Sixth
Amendment rights of trial by an impartial jury and effective assistance of
counsel. Moreover, the ample discretion the Third Circuit granted to Joseph's decision may encourage future circuit courts to hear ineffective
assistance of counsel claims with a similar "anything goes" attitude. Such
an approach by the courts would constitute a threat to the constitutional
rights of criminal defendants. It is disconcerting to contemplate that if
future courts rely upon the court's holding in Weatherwax, the essence of
Strickland may be emasculated and racial partisanship may again become a
significant facet of jury selection.
156. See United States v. Hughes, 635 F.2d 449, 452 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[A]
defense counsel's trial strategy, which would include his asking or refraining from
asking certain questions of witnesses, does not reach constitutional proportions.").
See generally United States v. Samuels, 59 F.3d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding
that defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel at sentencing when
counsel failed to object to pre-sentence investigation report's finding that defendant smuggled crack rather than cocaine into country); Lovett v. Florida, 627 F.2d
706, 708 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[C]ounsel for a criminal defendant is not required to
pursue every path until it bears fruit or until all conceivable hope withers.");
United States v. Johnson, 615 F.2d 1125, 1127 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that defense counsel satisfied duty to interview potential witnesses and conduct examination of factual circumstances); Buckelew v. United States, 575 F.2d 515, 521 (5th
Cir. 1978) (holding that defense counsel's failure to call certain witness is not suffi-

cient grounds for Sixth Amendment claim).
157. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's holding and rationale in Weatherwax, see supra notes 77-107 and accompanying text.
158. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d 1425, 1426-36
(3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 538 (1996).
159. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 79 (stating that it is unreasonable to assume
that African-American jurors are more likely to sympathize and favor AfricanAmerican defendants because of their shared race); Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1431-35
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-91 (1984) (outlining requirements to prove ineffective assistance of counsel and recognizing effective assistance
of counsel as fundamental constitutional right that must be protected)).
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The legal community and prospective clients should remain hopeful,
however, that future courts will properly consider professional rules and
standards when evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The
violation of professional rules and standards may implicate the imperiling
of constitutional rights and should therefore be accorded an important
place in the courts' analyses.
Deborah Cirilla
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